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Abstract 
. his is a study of humankind from the perspectives 
of a representative from psychology, the psychoanalytic 
British object-relations physician and psychoanalyst, 
William Ronald Dodds Fairbairn, M.D. (1889 to 1965), and 
from theology, the Western Orthodox Christian Dominican 
theologian and Doctor of the Church, St. Thomas Aquinas, 
O.P. (Order of Preachers) (1225 to 1274). 
These theorist/practitioners share a common 
scientific and philosophical method dedicated to the 
discovery of reality under God. Each believed that a 
person's nature is relationally based. Both believed 
that the person is a psyche and soma, a psychological 
and biological, unity. Each believed that turning from 
real relationship and turning to less real relationship 
is against the nature of the person, separating the 
iii 
person frbm reality, splitting one in one's devotion, 
and thus causing detrimental psychological, or 
spiritual, consequences. 
This author asserts that the concept of 
relationship is the key to a psychoanalytic object-
relations theoretical and Thomistic theological 
understanding of the human personality. It also posits 
that this concept of relationship may serve as an 
integration point between psychology and theology. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Focus 
Broad Focus 
The study of humankind is undertaken by various 
disciplines such as medicine, nursing, sociology, 
psychology, and theology. Each has a different and 
helpful perspective. Taken together, these fields 
offer a wide perspective. Put together, these field 
are powerful resources for explaining and improving 
human life. It seems natural to compare and contrast 
views from distinct areas of study to augment and 
synergize findings. A goal of this paper is to show 
the inherent congruity of psychology and theology and 
the efficacy each holds toward explaining human 
living. 
A cry is heard from the field of psychology to 
return to scientific standards of practice. "Clinical 
psychology has no standards of practice. How is 
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competence to be judged in the absence of standards? 
In the meantime, enthusiasm for licensure, 
designation, and other professionally competitive 
maneuvers continues unabated" (Sechrest, 1992, p. 
682). Defining what is scientific and what is not is 
fundamental to this task. Needed are scientifically 
strong clinicians, experimenters, and theoreticians. 
But also fundamental are the assumptions and the 
logical methodology employed. For this, sound 
philosophical minds are needed. 
Howard (1985) believes that to build a science of 
psychology, values are crucial. Commenting on 
Mahatma Ghandi's statement that one of the seven sins 
of the world is "science without humanity," Howard 
heralds the call to "construct a science of humans 
built upon an image of humanity that reflects and 
reveres human nature in all its diversity, complexity, 
and subtlety" (p. 264). Those professing a religious 
world view have special reason to pursue with 
integrity a value based science of psychology. 
This paper is an investigation of one 
representative from the world of psychology and one 
from that of theology. Represented are two men who, 
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in some measure, met the challenge of Sechrest and 
Howard. One was a rigorous clinical and theoretical 
scientist with sound philosophical and theological 
training. The other was a theologian whose 
philosophical mind and dedication to empirical reality 
is unsurpassed. One was a psychiatrist of the 20th 
century. The other was a theologian of the 13th 
century. If commonalities exist between this pair 
separated by seven centuries, all the more timeless 
the truths would prove to be. 
Narrower Focus 
For this paper the focus in the area of 
psychology is clinical psychology and the focus in 
theology is Christianity. Further, the spotlight is 
narrowed within psychology to psychoanalytic British 
object-relations theory and within theology to Western 
Orthodox Christianity. The following figure may 
clarify these domains and subclassifications. 
Figure 1. Focus of the paper. 
Psychology 
Clinical Psychology 
Psychoanalysis 
British Object-Relations 
W. R. D. Fairbairn 
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Theology 
Christianity 
Western Tradition 
Western Orthodoxy 
Thomas Aquinas 
As representative of psychoanalytic British 
object-relations theory, the subject is the Scottish 
physician and psychoanalyst, William Ronald Dodds 
Fairbairn, M.D. (1889 to 1965) .1 As representative of 
Western Orthodox Christianity, the choice is the 
Italian Dominican theologian and Doctor of the Church, 
St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P. (Order of Preachers) (1225 to 
1274). Each was a foundational theorist, who, though 
standing on the shoulders of great minds, Freud for 
lrn this paper, Fairbairn's spelling of the term 
"object-relations," which he coined, is retained 
instead of the North American spelling which is 
without the hyphen. 
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for Fairbairn and Aristotle and the Church Fathers for 
Aquinas, themselves advanced their discipline to such 
a degree that their work has laid a firm foundation 
upon which current thinkers continue to build. 
It is posited here that a careful reading and 
analysis of the work of w. R. D. Fairbairn, paired 
with an examination of the data of Thomistic theology, 
will bring to light the significance each holds for 
the other. Fairbairn's theory has particular 
application for psychodynamic therapists professing a 
religious, and especially a Christian, world view. 
Aquinas' works have been the cornerstone of much 
Christian thinking throughout the ages. 
Method 
Integration 
Attempts at integrating theology and psychology 
can be hampered by a lack of conceptualization 
regarding how this should be accomplished. Much of 
the disagreement and confusion swirl around methods 
and data far out on the practical end of the spectrum. 
Because these practical theological and psychological 
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considerations are derived from theory, they include 
within themselves any inconsistencies that existed in 
their theoretical foundations. 
This is the reason for the journey back to some 
of the foundations of psychoanalytic object-relations 
theory and Western Orthodox Christian theology. 
Successful work here would have the effect of opening 
the door to further integration at the philosophical 
level, the result being a greater congeniality between 
these domains. 
Scope 
This paper is written for those interested in the 
theory and practice of psychology, particularly 
clinicians. There is an attempt to put theological 
concepts in "user friendly" terms. This is not a 
systematic rendering of these men's works but a 
topical exposition of key issues. Yet it is intended 
to be true to the meaning of the authors cited. It is 
written, not by an expert in, but by an admirer and 
devotee of psychoanalytic British object-relations and 
Thomistic thinking. The paper is not the tight 
formulation of a new integrative paradigm but a 
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dialogical foundation for further work toward that 
end. It is not meant as the last word, but as an 
introduction. It is not a destination point, but a 
point of departure. 
This work attempts to represent the actual 
positions of Fairbairn and Aquinas. There is no 
concentrated attempt at proving their ideas, though 
this author supports their veracity in the main, but 
only at presenting them accurately and clearly. There 
is, however, an attempt to show the parallels between 
the thinking of Fairbairn and Aquinas. 
The remainder of this chapter discusses reasons 
for the selection of Fairbairn and Aquinas as 
representatives of psychology and theology 
respectively. It then puts forth the thesis, with 
necessary definitions, and outlines the structure of 
the paper. 
WhY Fairbairn? 
Five reasons may be given explaining the 
motivation to present Fairbairn's theory in 
particular. First, of all the models in existence, 
Fairbairn's is arguably one of the clearest and purest 
expression of the shift from the Freudian drive model 
Psychoanalytic Object-Relations 
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to a relational model (Mitchell, 1988, p. 2; 
Sutherland, 1989, p. 162). Second, until recently, 
his work has been overlooked in the psychoanalytic 
community due to the difficulty in extracting theory 
from his papers and the perceived closeness of his 
work with that of Melanie Klein. 
A third reason for making Fairbairn's theory the 
focus of the first part of this study is his exposure 
and adherence to Christianity. A fourth reason is the 
influence of Fairbairn's theory upon present 
psychoanalytic theorists. Sutherland made the 
following remarkable claim. 
[Fairbairn] was the first to propose in a 
systematic manner the Copernican change of 
founding the psychoanalytic theory of human 
personality on the experiences within social 
relationships instead of on the discharge of 
instinctual tensions originating solely within 
the individual. (p. 162) 
In expanding object-relations of the individual 
to couple and family therapy, David and Jill Scharff 
(1991) of the Washington School of Psychiatry pay 
homage to Fairbairn, setting much of the theoretical 
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base of their work upon the foundation of his original 
writings. Stephen Mitchell, Greenberg's co-author 
(1983), has written a 1988 volume that references 
Fairbairn extensively. Seinfeld's newly released book 
(1991) is described by Eigen in this way: "What is 
especially important is his emphasis on Fairbairn, 
whose work has not received the attention it deserves 
in this country. . I have long felt the neglect of 
Fairbairn has left a hole in my understanding of many 
clinical problems ... " (Eigen, 1991, pp. 4, 5). 
Finally, Fairbairn's work is striking in its 
anticipation. Current infant research has served to 
confirm a great many of Fairbairn's observations. In 
fact, two decades before Mahler's landmark infant 
studies (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975), Fairbairn 
was calling attention to the importance of the early 
dyadic relationship. The work of Stern (1985) has 
also tended to reinforce the prescient aspect of 
Fairbairn's insights. 
WhY AQuinas? 
Aquinas' work is of an immense intellectual 
force. He is credited with having written over 90 
works, of which many were in multiple volumes. Few 
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theologians have been more dedicated to the 
application of philosophical principles to the arena 
of Christian faith, to the melding of faith and 
reason, than he. Commonweal has said that the 
partnership of faith and reason is the very heart and 
soul of Aquinas' writings, and his work on this issue 
is a "challenge to eradicate prejudice in favor of 
argument, an opportunity to discover the indissoluable 
partnership of the two" (Gilson, 1963, p. 386). As 
such, his work has been chosen here, first, because of 
his monumental intellectual effort in the area of 
subjective and objective reality, of sacred and 
secular, of faith and science. 
In his work, The Intellectual Life, the Dominican 
A. G. Sertillanges has said, "The Church believes 
today, as she believed from the first, that Thomism is 
an ark of salvation, capable of keeping minds afloat 
in the deluge of doctrine" (Aquinas, 1981, foreword) . 
In great measure, Western Christianity has been built 
on the foundation Aquinas has laid. Though by no 
means representing a view homogeneous to Western 
Christianity or Roman Catholicism, he is nonetheless a 
standard by which subsequent theologies are compared. 
Psychoanalytic Object-Relations 
11 
Orthodox Protestants are also reclaiming alignment 
with Aquinas as the prejudice against him, borne out 
of reformation enmity, has diminished (Geisler, 1975, 
p. 192)). A second reason Aquinas' work has been 
chosen here, then, is because it represents a large 
and weighty segment of history and thought in the 
Western Orthodox Christian tradition. 
The third reason St. Thomas was chosen is because 
of his intense work on the psychology of humankind. 
Gardeil (1959) has written an entire work devoted to 
Thomistic psychology. Much contemporary thought 
concerning the science and philosophy of human being 
is based on Aquinas' solid concepts. Agreed or 
opposed, all who deal in the subject of psychology are 
forced to grapple with the very same issues he did. 
WhY Fairbairn and Aquinas? 
The reason for including Aquinas in a comparison 
with Fairbairn is the commonality each has with the 
other. This is covered more fully in chapter four. 
These men were not only theorists but practitioners. 
Fairbairn and Aquinas both introduced a Copernican-
like change to their discipline while holding firm to 
the traditional foundations. Each provided a 
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foundation upon which others have built. Each was 
passionately dedicated to the lifelong pursuit of 
truth as expressed in reality. Each integrated sacred 
and secular fields of study and applied it to his 
particular discipline. 
Thesis 
The proposition for consideration in this paper 
is that there is a most important commonality between 
these two men. The essential theme within Fairbairn's 
psychoanalytic object-relations theory, the primacy of 
relationship, is an already embedded thematic within 
Christian theology as espoused by Aquinas. In 
essence, the task is to expose a pre-existing state of 
affairs. 
This dissertation asserts that the concept of 
relationship is the key to a psychoanalytic object-
relations theoretical and Thomistic theological 
understanding of the human personality. Second, that 
this concept of relationship may serve as an 
integration point between psychology and theology. 
But before this can be further elucidated, a 
definition of terms is necessary. 
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Human relationship is the irreducible minimum, 
necessary basis, most fundamental need, the sine qua 
non of human existence. It gives ultimate meaning and 
supreme value to human life. Relationship is the 
primary motivation for human living. Fairbairn said 
that relationship is the significance of human living 
and that "psychology may be said to resolve itself 
into a study of the relationships of the individual to 
his objects ... " (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 60). Aquinas 
has said, "man's perfect good is that he somehow know 
God." (Aquinas, 1975b, p. 35; Aquinas, 1981, p.583; 
Gardeil, 1959, p. vii). 
Definition. "Relationship" is defined as "the 
state or character of being related or interrelated: 
connection, as in 'show the relationship between two 
things'" (Webster, 1973). Secondly, it is defined by 
Webster as "kinship" and thirdly as a "state of 
affairs existing between things having relations or 
dealings, as in 'had a good relationship with his 
family.'" This dissertation focuses on the use of the 
word as applied to persons. 
A "relation," here, is "the attitude or stance 
which two or more persons or groups assume toward one 
Psychoanalytic Object-Relations 
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another," or "the state of being mutually or 
reciprocally interested (as in social or commercial 
matters)" (Webster, 1973). A personal relation occurs 
when a person has an attitude, stance, or a state of 
being interested in another person. This attitude of 
interest implies some form of communication involving 
intellect and usually behavior. 
Primacy of relationship. This paper is not 
speaking of the relationship between things, concepts, 
or places but relationship between persons, external 
and internal. In speaking of relationship between 
persons, it is not focusing on the proximity, 
chronicity, or biologic interaction between persons, 
though these do describe processes involved in 
personal relationship. Instead, this paper focuses on 
the subjective experience, the existential quality of 
personal relationship, not as a means to production of 
something, but as an end in itself. Relationship .ia 
the production. In this dissertation, use of the word 
"relationship" denotes this specialized meaning unless 
otherwise indicated. 
Structure 
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The manner in which Fairbairn reoriented drive 
theory can be traced relatively easily throughout his 
papers. The method of investigating that transition 
here is to examine what Fairbairn had to say about 
personality theory. This will involve exposition with 
the hope of tapping into the essential idea Fairbairn 
pursued with vigor for so many years. Aquinas' 
thought will similarly be analyzed with regard to his 
understanding of the theological discipline of 
anthropology. The following simple figure shows this 
parallel relationship and structure of the paper. 
Fi9ure 2. Structure of the paper. 
Fairbairn 
Personality Theory 
Aquinas 
Anthropology 
The plan of this paper is to delineate the nature 
of the relationship between psychoanalytic object-
relations psychology and Western Orthodox Christian 
theology. Analysis of W. R. D. Fairbairn's writings 
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will constitute the second chapter of the paper, 
followed by an analysis of the relevant data from the 
theology of Thomas Aquinas in the third chapter. From 
these analyses will emerge a common principle that 
will act as a unifying theme for both domains. This 
is covered in the fourth chapter. 
Psychoanalytic Object-Relations 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRIMACY OF RELATIONSHIP FOR FAIRBAIRN 
Introduction to Fairbairn 
This chapter is in two parts. The first part 
introduces W. R. D. Fairbairn's work and the method he 
employed in his psychoanalytic object-relations 
theory. The second part discusses his innovative 
formulations on personality theory. Three questions 
of personality theory will serve as the major 
divisions of the second part. What is a person? How 
is a person put together? Why is there a problem? 
Work of Fairbairn 
Literature Review 
The following two categories will provide the 
structure of the literature review. The first is the 
literature most basic and foundational, consisting of 
Fairbairn's works. In the second section, the first 
applications of object-relations theory to theological 
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studies, Christianity in particular, will be 
investigated. These have been included for their 
contributions to the interdisciplinary dialogue 
addressed in this dissertation. 
Fairbairn's Works. Sutherland's (1989) 
remarkable claim about Fairbairn bears repeating. 
He was the first to propose in a systematic 
manner the Copernican change of founding the 
psychoanalytic theory of human personality on the 
experiences within social relationships instead 
of on the discharge of instinctual tensions 
originating solely within the individual. (p. 
162) 
Sutherland's (1989) book, Fairbairn's Journey into the 
Interior, is an important biography which links 
Fairbairn's life with his work. 
Fairbairn's volume An Object-Relations Theory of 
the Personality (1952a) is foundational in the sense 
that it traces his journey from acceptance of the 
assumptions underlying Freud's drive theory to a 
theory of object-relations based upon radically 
different assumptions. The volume contains the five 
papers embodying the working out of his new point of 
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view, in addition to three clinical papers and five 
miscellaneous papers. 
"Schizoid Factors in the Personality" (1940), the 
first of the theoretical articles, describes 
Fairbairn's decision to analyze a group of patients 
not normally considered good candidates for 
psychoanalysis. Resident within these schizoid 
clients, noted Fairbairn, is the basic psychic 
condition shared by all persons, namely, the presence 
of splits in the ego. 
Evident in Fairbairn's structural description is 
the influence of Melanie Klein, the main provider of 
the tools Fairbairn would require to reorient Freud's 
theory. Also important in this article is the 
attention Fairbairn called to the earliest dyadic 
relationship. From this relationship, he postulated, 
could be traced the early phenomenon of ego splitting. 
"A Revised Psychopathology of the Psychoses and 
Psychoneuroses" (1941) could as well have been titled, 
"How the Splitting of the Ego Originated." 
Fairbairn's growing discontent with Freudian precepts 
is conspicuous here. His headline, "The Inherent 
Limitations of Libido Theory", is telling. 
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Essentially, Fairbairn "recasted" orthodox libido 
theory based upon what he considered the proper unit 
of study. It is "high time", he wrote, that classical 
theory be transformed into "a theory of development 
based essentially upon object-relationships" 
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 31). 
In the third of the theory articles, "The 
Repression and Return of Bad Objects" (1943), 
Fairbairn continued reworking the drive theory 
assumptions he was finding untenable. He critiques 
orthodox theory in terms of twentieth-century physics, 
proposing a theory of dynamic structure he finds more 
synchronous with the science of his day. 
The cogency of Fairbairn's theory comes into 
clear view in this article in his description of 
repetition compulsion. While Freud had to go "Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle" for his rationale, the 
explanatory power of Fairbairn's theory is clearly 
demonstrated. In addition, Fairbairn begins to detail 
his notion of the ego. 
"Endopsychic Structure Considered in Terms of 
Object-Relationships" (1944), the fourth article, 
intends, as the title implies, to offer a replacement 
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for Freud's tripartite structural theory. The 
lengthiest of Fairbairn's articles, it traces the 
process and mechanics of ego splitting. But while his 
writing becomes increasingly technical and involved, 
an ever-present aspect of his theory comes clear, 
i.e., the personal nature of the early mother-infant 
relationship. 
He goes on to say that central to object-
relations theory is the person and his or her 
relationships. This is in contradistinction to 
Freud's emphasis on the organism and its processes. 
Fairbairn is attempting to account for psychological 
conflict at the personal level. Freud's explanations, 
by virtue of their underlying assumptions, necessarily 
took him outside the personal domain. 
The fifth of Fairbairn's main papers, "Object-
Relationships and Dynamic Structure" (1946), continues 
to develop lines of thought begun in earlier writings. 
His main thesis is summarized by a female patient who 
protested, "You're always talking about my wanting 
this and that desire satisfied; but what I really want 
is a father" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 137). Other 
contrasts between his theories and Freud's are 
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enumerated, with Fairbairn's conveyance of due respect 
for Freud in spite of their central points of 
difference. Fairbairn here declares that "Freud's 
whole system of thought was concerned with object-
relationships~ (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 149). Fairbairn 
believed the difference between Freud and himself was 
in how each accounted for object-relationships. 
Object-relations applied to theology. Harry 
Guntrip, a protegee of Fairbairn, is especially 
qualified to discuss the relationship between 
Fairbairn's theory of object-relations and religious 
issues. Trained in religion and philosophy (like 
Fairbairn), clergyman Guntrip became enamored with 
Fairbairn's theory, and saw in it the needed 
corrective to drive theory. 
Though his representation of Fairbairn's theory 
has been criticized by some, Guntrip has done a 
service not only by calling attention to the 
significance of Fairbairn's work, but by seizing upon 
the reason it is significant. In his Personality 
Structure and Human Interaction: The Developing 
Synthesis of Psychodynamic Theory (1977), the stated 
theme is to trace the way in which psychoanalysis has 
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"outgrown its origins in a neuropsychological and 
psychobiological philosophy of man, using the instinct 
concept as the basis of theory, into a truly 
psychodynamic theory of the personality implying a 
philosophy of man that takes account of his reality as 
an individual person" (p. 17). Guntrip believed 
Fairbairn's object-relations theory represented that 
truly psychodynamic theory into which psychoanalysis 
was growing. Guntrip (1977), commented on Fairbairn's 
integration of religion and psychology: 
For Fairbairn religion is an impressive activity 
and experience of human beings . . . and is to be 
approached . . . with sympathetic insight in 
order to understand what human beings have 
actually been seeking and doing in their 
religious life, . . . religion provides a more 
illuminating analogy to the aims and processes of 
psychotherapy than either science or education 
do. He [Fairbairn] even recognizes no 
inconsiderable part of psycho-dynamic theory 
implicit, if not yet scientifically formulated, 
in religious concepts. . . Fairbairn's 
interest in the psychology of religion is one 
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expression of his fundamental concern with 
'object-relationships' as the substance of human 
living. (pp. 252, 253) 
Another clinician influenced by Fairbairn's works 
is Ana-Maria Rizzuto. Her book, The Birth of the 
Living God (1979), attempts to trace "the genesis of a 
person's representation of God" in the course of 
development and how the person uses that 
representation during the life cycle (p. viii). Her 
review of the psychoanalytic literature includes both 
Klein and Fairbairn, whose theoretical constructs 
provide a useful way of viewing an important aspect of 
religious behavior. W. W. Meissner, an endorser of 
Rizzuto's book, has contributed in this same arena. 
Psychoanalysis and Religious Experience (1984) marks 
his effort to bring about a rapprochement between 
these two domains. Meissner mainly calls upon the 
contributions of Winnicott (1971), a contemporary of 
Fairbairn's. 
John McDargh (1983) has provided a comprehensive 
example of object-relations perspectives informing 
religious thought, with Psychoanalytic Object-
relations Theory and the Study of Religion: On Faith 
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and the Imaging of God. He regards the contributions 
of Fairbairn as foundational for any study concerned 
with these two disciplines. His colleague, Jones 
(1991), a clinical psychologist and professor of 
religion, wrote Contemporary Psychoanalysis and 
Religion, drawing from more recent object-relations 
theorists in addition to Fairbairn. 
His Thought 
Fairbairn himself summed up his theory in his 
1958 article, "On the Nature and Aims of Psycho-
Analytical Treatment" (p. 374). 
In brief, my theoretical position may be said to 
be characterized by four main conceptual 
formulations:--viz. (a) a theory of dynamic 
psychical structure, (b) a theory to the effect 
that libidinal activity is inherently and 
primarily object-seeking, (c) a resulting theory 
of libidinal development couched, not in terms of 
presumptive zonal dominance, but in terms of the 
quality of dependence, and (d) a theory of the 
personality couched exclusively in terms of 
internal object-relationships. 
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Fairbairn goes on to say that he sees the first 
two of these to be a substitute for Freud's classic 
libido theory and final theory of instincts. The 
third he views as a revision of Abraham's version of 
Freud's theory of libidinal development. Fairbairn 
means for the fourth to replace Freud's description of 
the mental structure of id, ego, and superego. 
This last [fourth] has assumed the form of a 
description in terms of a libidinal ego, a 
central ego and an antilibidinal ego, together 
with their respective internal objects; and the 
basic endopsychic situation so constituted is 
conceived as resulting from the splitting of an 
original, inherent, unitary ego and of the object 
originally introjected by it. (Fairbairn, 1958, 
p. 374) 
This brief overview precedes the more detailed 
account of Fairbairn's work in the following sections. 
The next section is meant to provide the reader with 
an introduction to the scientific method Fairbairn 
employed in his clinical and theoretical work. 
Writing Style 
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Method of Fairbairn 
Several challenges and privileges meet the 
Fairbairn researcher. One, is that he himself said of 
his major work that he is offering "not the systematic 
elaboration of an already established point of view, 
but the progressive development of a line of thought" 
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 133). His work is a collection 
of papers and so, as with Freud, one is enabled to re-
live the unfolding of the issues with which he 
grappled. 
Fairbairn wrote in an analytical and systematized 
manner, compressing many concepts into few words. In 
poetry, the qualities of brevity, aesthetics, and 
logical permutations and combinations are integral to 
the powerful creative force of the work. Perhaps 
Fairbairn's background in philosophy and theology, 
like that of the poet T. S. Eliot, helps give his 
writing its depth. Something of the dynamic of 
Fairbairn's work is in his style. It is his very 
preciseness and incisiveness on major issues in 
personality theory which has made history. He has 
done so with great clarity and impact. 
Psycho-analytic Science 
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Fairbairn deals with the methodology of 
psychoanalysis in his 1952, 1955, and 1958 articles. 
In his 1958 paper, he begins by quoting his 1955 
article's view of science in general. He says that 
science is 
'essentially an intellectual tool and nothing 
more.' From this point of view, scientific 
truth, so far from providing an (even 
approximately) accurate picture of reality as it 
exists, is 'simply explanatory truth;' and the 
'picture of reality provided by science is an 
intellectual construct representing the fruits of 
an attempt to describe the various phenomena of 
the universe, in as coherent and systematic a 
manner as the limitations of human intelligence 
permit, by means of the formulation of general 
laws established by inductive inference under 
conditions of maximum emotional detachment and 
objectivity on the part of the scientific 
observer [italics original].' (p. 376) 
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Farther along in this article he gives his view 
of the particular science in which he admits 
operating--psychological science. 
'Where psychological science is concerned, a 
certain difficulty arises owing to the fact that 
the subjective aspects of the phenomena studied 
are as much part of the phenomena as the 
objective aspects, and are actually more 
important; and the subjective aspects can only be 
understood in terms of the subjective experience 
of the psychologist himself.' (Fairbairn, 1958, 
pp . 3 7 6' 3 7 7 ) 
He then says that the psychologist must adopt as 
detached and objective a stance as possible, with 
respect to his own experience and the experience of 
those he observes. He posits that this has particular 
application to those involved in "psycho-analytical 
science." He notes that the psycho-analyst (his 
spelling) is not primarily a scientist but a 
psychotherapist and as such is involved a departure 
from the scientific method. Being a psychotherapist 
implies that the value of being free of symptoms is 
better than being dominated by them, whereas being a 
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scientist does not. Taking on the therapeutic role 
necessarily involves "'the acceptance of human values 
other than the explanatory value which is the sole 
value accepted by science'" (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 377). 
Even still, Fairbairn claims that object-
relations (his spelling) theory, with its emphasis on 
the real relationship between the therapist and 
patient, provides a psychology which "not only 
promotes therapeutic aims more effectively than the 
predominantly 'impulse-psychology' formulated by 
Freud, but actually corresponds more closely to the 
psychological facts and possesses a greater 
explanatory value from a purely scientific standpoint" 
(Fairbairn, 1958, p. 377). 
How is psycho-analysis science? Fairbairn says 
the technique itself constitutes a valid experimental 
method. The limitations imposed are not those 
inherent in the method but from the commitment to the 
humanitarian values of being therapeutic. Based on 
the technique of free association, the phenomenon of 
transference, and the inference of a present inner 
reality, Fairbairn says 
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the experimental requirement of providing an 
opportunity for (to quote Ezriel) 'the 
observation of here and now [italics original] 
phenomena in situations which allow us to test 
whether a number of defined conditions will 
produce a certain predicted event' (Ezriel, 1951, 
lf/: 
p. 30). (Fairbairn, 1952, p. 127) 
The preceding introduction to Fairbairn's method 
is meant to serve as a guide to assessing and 
appreciating the content, reliability, and validity of 
his work. The following section, the second part of 
this chapter, deals with Fairbairn's concept of the 
person, his theory of personality. 
Personality Theory 
This section presents Fairbairn's view of what a 
person is (nature), how a person is put together 
(manner), and why there is a problem for the person 
(reason). Webster's first definition of "nature" is 
"the inherent character or basic constitution of a 
person or thing: essence" (1973, p. 766). By "manner" 
31 
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is meant the way or method, according to Webster, in 
which a person is structured (Webster, 1973, p. 700). 
"Reason" is defined by Webster as "a statement offered 
in explanation or justification" (1973, p. 962). The 
first part, then, discusses the person' nature as 
object seeking, the second speaks of the manner in 
which a person is structured as a pristine mind/body 
unity, and the third shows the reason there is a 
problem, namely, that of splits in the ego. 
Wbat is a Person--Nature? 
Introduction 
To understand Fairbairn, one must start with 
Freud. The following is Guntrip's (1973) rendering of 
an aspect of connection between the two. 
Freud's ideas fall into two main groups, (1) the 
id-plus-ego-control apparatus, and (2) the 
Oedipus complex of family object-relationship 
situations with their reappearance in treatment 
as transference and resistance. The first group 
of ideas tends to picture the psyche as a 
mechanism, an impersonal arrangement for securing 
detensioning, a homeostatic organization. The 
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second group tends toward a personal psychology 
of the influence people have on each other's 
lives, particularly parents on children. (p. 28) 
In the 1940s and early 1950s Fairbairn did 
call his work object-relationships theory, 
implying not a new theory, but a deliberate 
emphasis on the personal side of Freud's theory 
of parent-child (Oedipal) relations .... 
Object-relations is not a school of thought but a 
broad stream of thought, a steadily developing 
concentration on "the personal ego in object-
relat ions. (p. 24) 
Relationship Seeking 
Briefly stated, Fairbairn believed that life 
begins with the need for relationship, that a child's 
need for an object in the beginning is the motivation 
for development. It is the internalization of 
experience with the primary caregiver (object) that 
constitutes the vicissitudes of life. 
Fairbairn (1952a), in his 1940 paper on schizoid 
factors, describes the first outworking of this drive 
for relationship in the infant. 
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The child's oral relationship with his mother in 
the situation of suckling represents his first 
experience of a love relationship, and is, 
therefore, the foundation upon which all his 
future relationships with love objects are based. 
It also represents his first experience of a 
social relationship; and it therefore forms the 
basis of his subsequent attitude to society. (pp. 
6Q f 61) 
Guntrip (1989) speaks of the shift in 
psychoanalytic thinking that this represented in terms 
of libido. 
Fairbairn's object-relations theory arose out of 
his study of schizoid problems, and throws much 
light on the schizoid's 'life inside himself.' He 
laid it down that the goal of the individual's 
libido is not pleasure, or merely subjective 
gratification, but the object itself. He says: 
'Pleasure is the sign-post to the object' (1952a, 
p. 33). The fundamental fact about human nature 
is our libidinal drive towards good object-
relationships. The key biological formula is the 
adaptation of the organism to the environment. 
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The key psychological formula is the relationship 
of the person to the human environment. The 
significance of human living lies in object-
relationships, and only in such terms can our 
life be said to have meaning, for without object-
relations the ego itself cannot develop [italics 
original]. (pp. 19, 20) 
Fairbairn says that this theory of object-
relationships is not such a revolutionary step in 
psychoanalytic theory because many of the writings of 
Freud himself take for granted that libido is 
specifically object-seeking. Fairbairn quotes from 
page 95 of Freud's 1930 work, Civilization and its 
Discontents, which refers to Freud's original theory 
of instincts, though the distinction here made by 
Freud was later abandoned by him with his concept of 
narcissism. 
Thus first arose the contrast between ego 
instincts and object instincts. For the energy 
of the latter instincts and exclusively for them 
I introduced the term libido; an antithesis was 
then formed between the ego instincts and the 
libidinal instincts directed towards them. 
Psychoanalytic Object-Relations 
36 
Love seeks for objects. (Freud quoted in 
Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 83) 
Fairbairn (1952a) plots his course toward a 
theory emphasizing the personal, relational side to 
psychoanalysis in his 1941 paper, "A Revised 
Psychopathology of the Psychoses and Neuroses." 
There, his first statement to this end starts by 
paying homage to Freud's libido theory yet moves on to 
propose a different one. 
The historical importance of the libido theory 
and the extent to which it has contributed to the 
advance of psychoanalytical knowledge requires no 
elaboration; and the merit of the theory has been 
proved by its heuristic value alone. 
Nevertheless, it would appear as if the point had 
now been reached at which, in the interests of 
progress, the classic libido theory would have to 
be transformed into a theory of development based 
essentially upon object-relationships [italics 
original]. The great limitation of the present 
libido theory as an explanatory system resides in 
the fact that it confers the status of libidinal 
attitudes upon various manifestations which turn 
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out to be merely techniques for regulating the 
object-relationships of the ego [italics 
original]. The libido theory is based, of 
course, upon the conception of erotogenic zones. 
It must be recognized, however, that in the first 
instance erotogenic zones are simply channels 
through which libido flows, and that a zone only 
becomes erotogenic when libido flows through it. 
The ultimate goal of libido is the object 
[italics original] : . (p. 31) 
He goes on to explain that, in its search for the 
object, libido, operating like the laws which 
determine the flow of electricity, takes the path of 
least resistance, the erotogenic zone being considered 
the path of least resistance. In infancy, this path 
is the mouth, whereas in maturity, it is the genitals. 
"The real point about the mature individual is not 
that the libidinal attitude is essentially genital, 
but that the genital attitude is essentially 
libidinal" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 32). 
At the same time, it must be stressed that it is 
not in virtue of the fact that the genital level 
has been reached that object-relationships are 
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satisfactory. On the contrary, it is in virtue 
of the fact that satisfactory object-
relationships have been established that true 
genital sexuality is attained. (Fairbairn, 1952a, 
p. 32) 
Two years after the 1941 paper on revised 
psychopathology, Fairbairn wrote "The Repression and 
the Return of the Bad Objects (with special reference 
to the 'War Neuroses')." In it, he declares that, 
"the time is now ripe for a psychology of object-
relationships" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 60). He goes on 
to say that 
psychology may be said to resolve itself into a 
study of the relationships of the individual to 
his objects, whilst, in similar terms, 
psychopathology may be said to resolve itself 
more specifically into a study of the 
relationships of the ego to its internalized 
objects. (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 60)2 
2More will be said about internalized objects in 
the succeeding sections of this paper. 
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Thus Fairbairn affirmed a different thrust to 
psychoanalytic theory, the primacy of relationship as 
the substance of human living. The next section here 
looks more closely at how a person is structured, 
psyche and soma, mind and body, in order to seek 
relationship. 
How is a Person put together for Relationship--the 
Manner? 
Introduction 
The previous section on the nature of the person 
alluded several times to a person's erotogenic, 
biological functions (soma, body) as well as to the 
object seeking, psychological workings (psyche, mind) . 
How does Fairbairn see these interrelating? And is 
there essential unity in the self from birth, 
especially in the psyche? This is the subject 
broached in what follows here. 
Mind-Body Unity 
As regards the question of whether there is unity 
in the psyche of a new born, Fairbairn would answer 
yes, listing as his first theoretical assumption 
concerning the self, that the pristine personality of 
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the child consists of a unitary dynamic ego.3 This is 
in contradistinction to Freud who conceived of the ego 
as a structure which is essentially acquired (and not 
pristine), constituting, in essence, a modification. 
Freud said the ego originated as a structure which 
develops in the psyche to regulate id impulses in 
relation to the reality of the outside world. 
Thus it is an integral feature of Freud's 
description of 'the ego' that this structure is 
essentially a defensive (and not, like my 
'original ego', an inherent) structure; and it 
would appear to follow that Freud's 'ego' is 
founded upon a basis which is essentially 
psychopathological. (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 375) 
Fairbairn (1954) explains his method of 
describing the endopsychic situation in contrast to 
Freud's with a comparison to methods in physics. 
The conception of this basic endopsychic 
situation provides an alternative, couched in 
3Fairbairn later agreed with Guntrip that 'self' 
was a better term than 'ego' and so the two are used 
interchangeably in this paper (Scharff, 1990). 
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terms of personal relationships and dynamic ego-
structure, to Freud's description of the psyche 
in terms of id, ego and super-ego, based as this 
is upon a Helmholtzian divorce of energy from 
structure no longer accepted in physics, and 
combined as it is, albeit at the expense of no 
little inconsistency, with a non-personal 
psychology conceived in terms of biological 
instincts and erotogenic zones. (p. 109) 
Fairbairn believes that what classical Freudian 
metapsychology does is to take the human person 
who is [italics original] energy operating in 
directional ways (toward objects) and to 
superimpose upon that human process an artificial 
distinction between the activities and the energy 
presumed to be fueling them. . one is left 
with a set of energyless structures (the ego) and 
a pool of structureless energy (the id) . 
For Fairbairn, . . . Ego structures have energy--
are [italics original] energy--and that energy is 
structured and directed toward objects from the 
start. (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 155) 
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Thus, it is argued by Fairbairn that the ego is an 
integrated structure from the outset. He says that 
this conception is in conformity with the trend of 
biological science which says that the organism is 
conceived as a "patterned structure which functions as 
a whole in the absence of disintegrating influences" 
(Fairbairn, 1955, p. 149). 
A year subsequent to the 1943 paper on the return 
of the bad objects, Fairbairn wrote, "Endopsychic 
Structure Considered in Terms of Object-
Relationships." Herein he articulates some of the 
intricacies of the relationship between the psychical 
phenomenon of object-relationships and the somatic 
realities of instincts and impulses. 
The limitations of impulse psychology make 
themselves felt in a very practical sense within 
the therapeutic field; for, whilst to reveal the 
nature of his 'impulses' to a patient by 
painstaking analysis is one proposition, to 
enable him to know what to do with these 
'impulses' is quite another. What an individual 
shall do with his 'impulses' is clearly a problem 
of object-relationships. . . . In a word 
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'impulses' cannot be considered apart from the 
endopsychic structures which they energize and 
the object-relationships which they enable these 
structures to establish; and, equally, 
'instincts' cannot profitably be considered as 
anything more than forms of energy which 
constitute the dynamic of such endopsychic 
structures. (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 84, 85) 
This formulation would suggest that the 
biological is substantially in the service of the 
psyche, to promote its ends of object seeking. But it 
is not a slave relationship, as if one ruled the 
other, but a cooperation, a unity of mind and body 
relating. Fairbairn says it is not, as Freud 
believed, that the ego regulates id impulses in 
relation to the reality of the outside world but that 
the ego is the source of impulse-tension from the 
beginning. "No 'impulses' can be regarded as existing 
in the absence of an ego structure, it will no longer 
be possible to preserve any psychological distinction 
between the id and the ego" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 88). 
In other words, the person starts out with a pristine, 
unitary structure, with its own dynamic impulses 
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originating from within the ego itself, not with 
impulses acting on it from another structure (id) . 
This inclusion of the id in the ego will, of 
course, leave essentially unaffected Freud's 
conception of the function [italics original] 
served by the 'ego' in regulating the discharge 
of impulse-tension in deference to the conditions 
of outer reality. It will, however, involve the 
view that 'impulses' are oriented towards 
reality, and thus to some extent determined by 
the 'reality principle', from the very beginning. 
(Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 88, 89) 
Cooperative Unity of Mind/Body Seen in Development 
Development of pysche and soma is coordinated and 
parallel, according to Fairbairn. He sees the 
physical, erotogenic zones as providing pathways for 
meeting the psychical, object-seeking needs. 
Naturally, these zones develop in maturity on a 
biological timetable. That they are employed in a 
psychologically mature way is not a psychical given. 
For example, Fairbairn would say that true genital 
sexuality is not attained just by reaching the 
biological stage of genital development but when 
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satisfactory object-relationships have been 
established. It is the coordination of the technique 
(erotogenic zone) with the goal of object seeking 
(psychological reality) which constitutes healthj• 
development. The libidinal technique does not 
determine the object-relationship. It is the object-
relationship which determines the libidinal technique. 
The function of libidinal pleasure is essentially 
to provide a sign-post to the object. To say the 
opposite, that the object is a sign-post to libidinal 
pleasure, is to put the cart before the horse and 
mistake technique for a primary libidinal 
manifestation. Fairbairn (1952a, pp. 33, 34) shows 
the difference in these two ways of thinking in 
answering the question, 'Why does a baby suck his/her 
thumb?' He says that if one answers that the baby's 
mouth is an erotogenic zone and sucking provides 
him/her with erotic pleasure, one is missing the 
point. 
A further question need be asked, 'Why the 
thumb?' Fairbairn would answer, 'Because there is no 
breast to suck.' "Even the baby must have a libidinal 
object; and, if he is deprived of his natural object 
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{the breast), he is driven to provide an object for 
himself" {1952a, pp. 33, 34). Fairbairn goes on to 
comment on autoerotism, that it is fundamentally a 
"technique whereby the individual seeks not only to 
provide for himself what he cannot obtain from the 
object, but to provide for himself an object which he 
cannot obtain" {1952a, pp. 33, 34). 
Of development, then, Fairbairn says, "the whole 
course of libidinal development depends upon the 
extent to which objects are incorporated and the 
nature of the techniques which are employed to deal 
with incorporated objects [italics original]" 
{Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 34). 
The development of object-relationships is 
essentially a process whereby infantile 
dependence upon the object gradually gives place 
to mature dependence upon the object. This 
process is characterized (a) by the gradual 
abandonment of an original object-relationship 
based upon primary identification, and {b) by the 
gradual adoption of an object-relationship based 
upon differentiation of the object. The gradual 
change which occurs in the nature of the object-
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relationship is accompanied by a gradual change 
in libidinal aim, whereby an original oral, 
sucking, incorporating and predominantly 'taking' 
aim comes to be replaced by a mature, non-
incorporating and predominantly 'giving' aim 
compatible with developed genital sexuality. 
(Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 34, 35) 
Fairbairn charted the development of object-
relationships, their accompanying erotogenic zones, 
and their natural objects (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 38-
41) . This scheme is represented in the following 
figure. 
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Figure 3. Development of object relationships. 
Developmental Stage Characterized 
by 
1. Infantile Dependence •attitude of 
taking 
•incorporating 
a. Early Oral •suck or reject 
Object 
•breast of 
(pre-ambivalent) mother 
b. Late Oral 
2. Transition between 
•sucking or 
biting 
(ambivalent) 
•dichotomy and 
(part object) 
•mother 
w/ breast 
(whole obj 
treated as 
part obj) 
Infantile Dependence exteriorization 
•person 
(whole obj 
and 
Mature Dependence, 
or Stage of Quasi-
Independence 
of treated as 
incorporated obj contents) 
(figure continues) 
Figure 3--Continued 
3. Mature Dependence 
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•attitude of •person 
giving (whole obj 
•accepted and with genital 
rejected objects organs) 
exteriorized 
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Maturity, that is, mature dependence, is not seen 
as the state of not needing others. In his 1941 
article, Fairbairn (1952a) contrasts this stage with 
infantile dependence. 
It is true, of course, that mature individuals 
are likewise dependent upon one another for the 
satisfaction of their psychological, no less than 
their physical, needs. Nevertheless, on the 
psychological side, the dependence of mature 
individuals is not unconditional. By contrast, 
the very helplessness of the child is sufficient 
to render him dependent in an unconditional 
sense. . . . His psychological dependence is 
further accentuated by the very nature of his 
object-relationships; for, as we have seen, this 
is based essentially upon identification. 
Identification may thus be regarded as 
representing the persistence into extra-uterine 
life of a relationship that existed before birth. 
In so far as identification persists after birth, 
the individual's object constitutes not only his 
world, but also himself; and it is to this fact, 
as has already been pointed out, that we must 
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attribute the compulsive attitude of many 
schizoid and depressive individuals towards their 
objects. Normal development is 
characterized by a process whereby progressive 
differentiation of the object is accompanied by a 
progressive decrease in identification. (p. 47) 
In infantile dependence, the conflict of the 
early stage is 'to suck or not to suck,' that is, 'to 
love or not to love.' This underlies the schizoid 
state. The conflict of the late oral stage is 'to 
suck or bite,' that is, 'to love or to hate.' This 
underlies the depressive state. "The great problem of 
the schizoid individual is how to love without 
destroying by love, whereas the great problem of the 
depressive individual is how to love without 
destroying by hate" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 49). 
In order to defend against the schizoid or 
depressive position, several techniques are used in 
the transitional stage. Each technique is a specific 
method for dealing with the conflict of the 
transitional stage, a conflict between the 
developmental urge to advance to an attitude of mature 
dependence on the object and a regressive reluctance 
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to abandon the attitude of infantile dependence on the 
object (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 38). They are not 
utilized in any order and may operate in combination. 
These techniques are put in chart form by 
Fairbairn and are presented below (Fairbairn, 1952a, 
pp. 43-46). It should also be noted that each object, 
the accepted and rejected object, is an internal 
object. "Internalized" means the person sees the 
object as in himself/herself. "Externalized" means 
the person sees the object as outside himself/herself. 
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Figure 4. Transitional stage techniques. 
Technique Accepted Obj Rejected Obj 
Obsessional Internalized Internalized 
Paranoid Internalized Externalized 
Hysterical Externalized Internalized 
Phobic Externalized Externalized 
As can be seen, this account of the unitary ego, 
the interplay between psyche and soma, and the course 
of development is not the whole story in the life of 
an individual. Introduced above is the idea of 
externalizing and internalizing internal objects in 
the transitional stage and identifying in the oral 
stages, the object even being perceived as the infant 
himself/herself. Although Fairbairn states that the 
newborn has a pristine, unitary, and inherently 
object-seeking ego, with the psyche and soma operating 
together through developmental stages and their 
appropriate erotogenic connections, he also observes a 
problem occurring which disturbs this course. The 
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reason why there is a problem is the subject of the 
next section. 
Wby is there a Problem in Relationship--the Reason? 
Introduction 
According to Fairbairn, life begins with the need 
for a relationship. The child's need for an object in 
the beginning is the motivation for development. The 
internalization of experience with the mother, the 
primary object, is that which constitutes the 
vicissitudes of life. It is the struggle to take in 
that experience and also to be one's own self, that 
is, to keep out aspects of the experience, to be 
autonomous, that determines development. 
In the beginning, the child takes in the pre-
ambivalent object. The only option is to take in or 
leave out, accept or reject. Then the child splits 
out what is too painful to be borne in consciousness. 
So splitting is the first organizing phenomenon, and 
it happens as a defense against painful experience, 
the mother who is not there when the infant needs her. 
This is the reason why there is a problem in 
development--splitting of the ego (Scharff, 1990). An 
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explanation of this phenomenon follows under the next 
sub-heading. 
The following figure on Fairbairn's ego structure 
is provided as a guide to the subsequent material. It 
is a rendering of Fairbairn's ego structure with the 
direction of repression indicated by arrows (Scharff & 
Scharff, 1991, March) . 
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Split in Integrity of Relating 
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Fairbairn (1952a) explains his theory of 
splitting in his 1954 article. The pristine 
personality of the child consists of a unitary and 
dynamic ego. The first defense employed by the 
original ego to deal with unsatisfying personal 
relationship is mental internalization, introjection, 
of the unsatisfying object. Jill Savage Scharff says 
that introjection 
is a way of dealing with an object that feels 
bad, by taking it inside and controlling it there 
by pushing it out of consciousness. This 
mechanism leaves good aspects of the object 
uncontaminated by the more troublesome exciting 
and rejecting aspects. (1992, p. 57) 
The unsatisfying object has two disturbing 
aspects, an exciting aspect and a rejecting aspect. 
The second defense used by the ego is to reject and 
split-off from the internalized object two elements--
one representing its exciting aspect and one 
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representing its rejecting aspect.4 David Scharff 
(1990) gives as an example of the exciting object, or 
the object excessively excitative of need, the mother 
who offered ice cream when milk would have done 
better, the mother who hovers too close because she is 
afraid of separation from the infant. She is always 
inducing the feeling that she must be needed, or why 
would she hover so closely? 
The internalized object is therefore split into 
three objects: exciting object, rejecting object, and 
the nucleus which remains after these elements have 
been split-off. This residual nucleus represents the 
relatively satisfying, tolerable, aspect of the 
internalized object. It is therefore not rejected by 
the ego but remains actively cathected. It is called 
the ideal object. Scharff (1990) calls this the "good 
enough object." The rejection and splitting-off of 
the exciting and rejecting objects constitute an act 
of "direct and primary repression" on the part of the 
4"Repression and splitting of the ego represent 
simply two aspects of the same fundamental process" 
(Fairbairn, 1954, p. 106). 
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ego. Since the exciting and rejecting objects remain 
cathected while in the process of being repressed, 
their repression involves a splitting-off from the 
substance of the ego of two portions of the ego. 
These portions represent the respective cathexes of 
the two repressed objects. 
The splitting-off of these two portions of the 
ego from its remaining central portion represents an 
act of "direct and secondary repression" on the part 
of the central portion. The resulting endopsychic 
situation is one in which there is a central ego 
cathecting the ideal object as an acceptable internal 
object and two split-off and repressed ego-structures, 
each cathecting a repressed internal object. 
Fairbairn called the repressed ego-structure 
cathecting the exciting object, the libidinal ego, and 
the repressed ego-structure cathecting the rejecting 
object, the antilibidinal ego.5 
SThe name Fairbairn first used for the repressed 
ego-structure cathecting the rejecting object was the 
"internal saboteur" instead of the "antilibidinal 
ego." Scharff (1990) says that this was his more 
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The name, "antilibidinal ego," is used on the 
grounds that the repressed ego-structure so 
designated, being in alliance with the rejecting 
object, has aims inherently hostile to those of the 
libidinal ego in its alliance with the exciting 
object. Being a dynamic structure, the antilibidinal 
ego implements its hostility to the aims of the 
libidinal ego by subjecting the libidinal ego to a 
sustained aggressive and persecutory attack which 
supports the repression already exercised against it 
by the central ego, and which it thus seems 
appropriate to describe as a process of "indirect 
repression." 
This indirect repression, where the 
antilibidinal, rejecting complex attacks the 
libidinal, need exciting complex, is seen in clinical 
settings. Scharff (1990) notes that couples act this 
out, coming in fighting like cats and dogs, yet not 
wanting a divorce. The anger is magnified to cover up 
clinical description while "antilibidinal ego" was the 
term he devised later when trying to smooth out his 
theoretical formulation with a clean symmetry. 
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this very painful longing. In this sense there is 
nothing as painful as unrequited longing for each 
other. These are people who have not been able to 
feel that their longing will be able to get a loving 
satisfaction from each other and they fight in order 
to subdue it, to keep down this unrequited longing. 
Although direct and indirect repression of the 
libidinal ego are two processes of a quite different 
nature, they are both included under the single term 
"repression" as understood by Freud. It should be 
noted that Freud took little account of direct 
repression of the antilibidinal ego by the central 
ego. The only references are in 
The Ego and the Id (Freud, 1927, pp. 52, 53, 74, 
75) in which he raised the questions why the 
super-ego is unconscious, and whether, in the 
case of the hysterical personality at any rate, 
this instigator of repression is not itself 
subject to repression--questions to which the 
exigencies of his own theory did not permit of a 
satisfactory answer. (Fairbairn, 1954, p. 108) 
Although the antilibidinal ego, the rejecting 
object and the ideal object are all independent 
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structures playing different roles in the economy of 
the psyche, they are all included by Freud in the 
comprehensive concept of the "the super-ego;" and this 
source of confusion may be obviated by recognition of 
their independent character. The endopsychic 
situation resulting from the twin processes of 
repression and splitting, which have just been 
described, is one which, in its general outlines, 
inevitably becomes established in the child at an 
early age, and in this sense may be regarded as 
"normal;" but, especially in its dynamic aspect, it 
contains within it the potentialities of all 
psychopathological developments in later life. 
By way of example, Fairbairn applies the 
foregoing explanation of splitting to the hysteric 
(Fairbairn, 1954, p. 109). For the hysteric, the 
exciting object is excessively exciting and the 
rejecting object is excessively rejecting. As such, 
the libidinal ego is excessively libidinal and the 
antilibidinal ego is excessively persecutory. This 
helps explain the intensity of the hysteric's 
repressed sexuality and the extent of her/his 
compulsive sacrifice of sexuality. 
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It might be helpful to refer to the Figure 4 in 
this chapter, the chart on four techniques used for 
dealing with the conflict of the transitional stage. 
In this figure, the hysteric technique is said to 
externalize the accepted object and internalize the 
rejected object. It must be remembered that each 
object, the accepted object and rejected object, are 
internal objects. The hysteric's externalized 
accepted object is seen in their intense love 
relationships. The internalized rejected object is 
seen in his/her dissociation, rejecting his/her own 
genitals which are identified "with the breast as the 
original libidinal object during the period of 
infantile dependence" (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 44, 45). 
In contrast with the hysteric technique of 
overvaluing objects in the outer world, the paranoid 
technique is to regard objects in the outer world as 
persecutors. The hysteric dissociates as a form of 
self-depreciation while the paranoid attitude is 
extravagantly grandiose. The paranoid state involves 
the externalization of the rejected object and 
internalization of the accepted object (Fairbairn, 
1952a, pp. 45, 46). 
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In his 1943 article, "The Repression and the 
Return of Bad Objects," Fairbairn speaks to the 
futility of repression as a means of coping. This is 
seen in the mechanism persons routinely use which he 
calls "the moral defense," or "the defence of the 
super-ego," or "the defence of guilt," against the bad 
object (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 65-67). The child would 
rather be bad himself /herself than to have bad 
objects. She/he takes into herself/himself, 
internalizes, the badness, the bad object in order to 
feel the sense of security which an environment of 
good objects can bring. 
The sense of outer security resulting from this 
process of internalization is, however, liable to 
be seriously compromised by the resulting 
presence within him of internalized bad objects. 
Outer security is thus purchased at the price of 
inner insecurity; and his ego is henceforth left 
at the mercy of a band of internal fifth 
columnists or persecutors, against which defences 
have to be, first hastily erected, and later 
laboriously consolidated. (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 
66) 
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The dilemma is placed in religious terms when he 
says that the person prefers conditional badness over 
unconditional badness. It is much better to be a bad 
person living in a world ruled by God than it is to be 
a good person in a world ruled by the devil. If you 
live in hell, there is no hope, it is unconditional, 
and being a good person doesn't help. But if you live 
in a world in which you are a sinner but salvation is 
eminent, there is always hope (Fairbairn, 1952a, pp. 
65-67) . 
Why does the child internalize bad objects? 
She/he is compelled to internalize them in order to 
control them. Yet, in attempting to control them in 
this way, the child is internalizing objects which 
have wielded power over her/him in the external world 
and which then retain their power over her/him in the 
inner world. 
In a word, he is 'possessed' by them, as if by 
evil spirits. This is not all, however. The 
child not only internalizes his bad objects 
because they force themselves upon him and he 
seeks to control them, but also, and above all, 
because he needs [italics original] them. If a 
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child's parents are bad objects, he cannot reject 
them, even if they do not force themselves upon 
him; for he cannot do without them. Even if they 
neglect him, he cannot reject them; for, if they 
neglect him, his need for them is increased. 
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 67) 
Freud's paper on a artist, Christoph Haitzmann, 
who made a pact with the Devil, conceptualizes the 
situation in classic "libido is primarily pleasure-
seeking" framework. Fairbairn disagrees when he 
comments on Freud's paper that 
the whole point of a pact with the Devil lies in 
the fact that it involves a relationship with a 
bad object. Indeed, this is made perfectly plain 
in the terms of Christoph's bond; for, 
pathetically enough, what he sought from Satan in 
the depths of his depression was not the capacity 
to enjoy wine, women, and song, but permission, 
to quote the terms of the pact itself, 'sein 
leibeigner Sohn zu sein' ('for to be unto him 
euen [sic] as a sonne of his bodie'). What he 
sold his eternal soul to obtain, accordingly, was 
not gratification, but a father, albeit one who 
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had been a bad object to him in his childhood. 
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 71) 
Fairbairn says that "libidinal 'badness' should 
be related to the cathexis of bad objects ('sin' 
always being regarded, according to the Hebraic 
conception, as seeking after strange gods, and 
according to the Christian conception, as yielding to 
the Devil) ... " (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 74). This 
again emphasizes his idea of selling one's 
relationships in the external world in exchange for 
relationships with the gods, or Devil, of the internal 
world. 
This section has spoken of Fairbairn's views on 
splitting and its effects on the persons functioning 
as she/he defends against the effects of such 
splitting. It has to do with exchanging the truth of 
the external world for the lie of the internal world, 
the pain of real relationships for the hope of more 
controlled, tolerable relationships, indeed, selling 
one's relationship with the outside world for one with 
devils. Regarding all psychopathology, Fairbairn says 
the following. 
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It is to the realm of these bad objects, I feel 
convinced, rather than to the realm of the super-
ego that the ultimate origin of all 
psychopathological developments is to be traced; 
for it may be said of all psychoneurotic and 
psychotic patients that, if a True Mass is being 
celebrated in the chancel, a Black Mass is being 
celebrated in the crypt. It becomes evident, 
accordingly, that the psychotherapist is the true 
successor to the exorcist, and that he is 
concerned, not only with 'the forgiveness of 
sins,' but also with 'the casting out of devils.' 
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 70) 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced w. R. D. Fairbairn's 
work, his method, and his groundbreaking formulations 
on personality theory. Three aspects of personality 
theory were discussed: that persons are object-
relationship seeking, that the ego is pristine and 
unitary at birth and develops as a psyche and body, 
and the problem of ego splitting. 
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The next chapter asks the same questions of St. 
Thomas Aquinas as were asked of Fairbairn concerning 
the person, only Aquinas' lens is that of the 
theological discipline of anthropology instead of the 
psychological one of personality theory. The 
questions asked concern introductory matters around 
Aquinas' work, his method, and his history making 
thinking on anthropology. What is a person? How is a 
person put together? Why is there a problem? These 
are the questions which will be explored as the next 
chapter unfolds. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PRIMACY OF RELATIONSHIP FOR AQUINAS 
Introduction to Aquinas 
Like the previous chapter, this chapter is in two 
parts. The first part introduces Thomas Aquinas' work 
and the method he employed in his philosophy and 
theology. The second part discusses his innovative 
formulations on anthropology. Three questions of 
anthropology will serve as the major divisions for the 
second part. What is a person? How is a person put 
together? Why is there a problem? 
Work of Aquinas 
Literature Reyiew 
This section divides Aquinas' works into two 
categories, translations of his actual works and 
commentaries on his life and work. Of his works, the 
major ones consulted here are the Summa Contra 
Gentiles (written 1258-1263), Summa Theologica 
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(written 1272-1273), Questions on the Soul (written 
1268-1270), and selected theological texts (Gilby, 
1955; Glenn, 1978; Pegis, 1948) . Of commentaries on 
his life and work, five are especially important for 
this paper. They are written by G. K. Chesterton 
(1956), H. D. Gardeil (1959), F. C. Copelston (1970), 
and E. Gilson (1963). 
Each of Aquinas' works below can be seen as a 
mixture of philosophy and Christian theology, each 
informing the other. The best know works of Aquinas 
are his two systematic ones, Summa Contra Gentiles (A 
Summary against the Gentiles) and Summa Theologica (A 
Summary of Theology) . His thought is most developed 
in these. The former was written first and is divided 
into four books. The first book was written in Paris 
and the other three in Italy. Tradition says that it 
was written to assist missionaries in the conversion 
of the Moors in Spain but the 'Gentiles' in his work 
are more naturalistic philosophers than Islamic 
devotees. "One of Aquinas' aims was to show that the 
Christian faith rests on a rational foundation and 
that the principles of philosophy do not necessarily 
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lead to a view of the world which excludes 
Christianity, .. " (Copelston, 1970, pp. 11-12). 
In the first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, 
God, he addresses the nature and existence of the 
divine. In the second book, Creation, he grapples 
with creation and the nature of the human soul, along 
with its relation to the body. The third (Providence) 
and fourth (Salvation) books look at the final end of 
humans, the former from a more rational perspective 
and the latter with a heavier draw on Christian 
doctrine. 
Aquinas stated that the Summa Theologica was 
written as a systematic summary for theology 
students.6 Pegis says it is "a classic synthesis of 
Christian thought and represents St. Thomas at his 
distinctive best" (1948, p. xii). History indicates 
that it was composed largely in Italy and also while 
in his second stay in Paris (1269-1272). There are 
three parts to the Summa and a supplement. The first 
6pegis says the correct title of the work is 
either Summa or Summa Theologiae, though tradition 
accepts the name Summa Theologica (1948, xii) . 
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concerns the subjects of God and creation along with a 
discussion of human nature and human intellectual 
life. The second has to do with human moral life, the 
first sub-part dealing with general moral themes and 
the final end of humanity and the second part 
directing attention to specific virtues and vices. 
Christ and the sacraments is the topic of the third 
part. 
Questions on the Soul (Aquinas, 1984) was written 
during St. Thomas' return residence in Paris. Its 
doctrinal organization runs parallel to that of the 
Summa Theologica. Translator J. H. Robb says the work 
concerns key points on the doctrine of the nature and 
constitution of the human being with an awareness of 
the Averroistic controversies then erupting at the 
University of Paris (pp. 17-19). The Islamic 
philosopher Averroes interpreted the third book of 
Aristotle's De Anima as affirming that there is only 
one intellect in all humans, all human minds being the 
internal modifications of the divine mind (Copelston, 
1970, pp. 176-178). 
Collections of theological texts compiled by 
Gilby, Pegis, and Glenn, provide an introduction to 
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Aquinas' works and a filling in of gaps on the topics 
covered in this paper. Glenn's helpful A Tour of the 
Summa is a "turnpike trip" through the entire Summa 
Theologica, a condensed paraphrase of its essential 
teaching. It includes an index. As such, A Tour is a 
precis strictly dictated by the text but reads like a 
brief commentary. Pegis' Introduction to St. Thomas 
Aquinas is a topical presentation of selected 
materials from the basic writings of Aquinas for the 
general reader. It draws from the Summa Theologica 
and the Summa Contra Gentiles and includes a good 
introduction but no index. 
Thomas Gilby has written a companion volume to 
his previous one on the philosophical texts of 
Aquinas, St. Thomas Aquinas Theological Texts, which 
likewise follows the organizational plan of the Summa 
Theologica. Gilby has intricately woven together 
major texts and opuscula (smaller works) of St. Thomas 
and cross referenced them with notes and an index. 
Where his paraphrase is deemed clearer, it is used 
instead of another, though the original is cited. 
The commentaries are indispensable for the rich 
store of textual, contextual, and theological guidance 
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they provide to Aquinas' difficult and profound works. 
There is no introductory work finer than that of 
Catholic layman G. K. Chesterton's, Aquinas (1956). 
Although Chesterton says of it that it is merely "a 
popular sketch of a great historical character who 
ought to be more popular," Aquinas scholars Pegis and 
Gilson highly acclaim it (pp. 12-15). Its genius is 
not in exhaustive treatment of the man and his work 
(there is no index) but in incisive comprehensiveness 
and literary style within the pages of a small volume. 
It presents Aquinas' biographical, philosophical, and 
theological insights in a way which compels the 
Protestant and modern thinker to rediscover Aquinas as 
foundational to Western society. 
H. D. Gardeil, O.P. shares the Dominican 
tradition with Aquinas. His work, Introduction to the 
Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas: Psychology, 
originally appearing in French as the third in a four 
volume set, is the first volume translated into 
English. It is a philosophical psychology, the 
doctrine of living being, which is aware of modern 
psychological thought. He follows closely the 
arrangement of Aristotle's De Anima and Aquinas' 
Psychoanalytic Object-Relations 
76 
commentary on the same. After tracing the history and 
meaning of psychology and the sources of St. Thomas' 
psychology, Gardeil defines life and the soul, 
vegetative and sensitive life, and the activities and 
nature of the intellectual soul. 
Father Copleston's Aquinas contains an excellent 
introduction to his work and then gives a strictly 
philosophical exposition of Aquinas' philosophical and 
theological works under the topics of metaphysics, 
God, creation, man, and Thomism. This scholarly yet 
accessible work includes a helpful index and 
biographical notes. 
One of the foremost conservative Thomist 
scholars, a member of the Pontifical Academy of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas in Rome, Etienne Gilson, has written a 
careful religious analysis, The Elements of Christian 
Philosophy, illuminating the key theological ideas of 
St. Thomas. Gilson (1963) accepts Pope Leo XIII's 
description of "Christian philosophy" as "that way of 
philosophizing in which the Christian faith and the 
human intellect join forces in a common investigation 
of philosophical truth" (p. v). The stated purpose of 
this work is to present Aquinas' key notions and 
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doctrinal positions, the essential elements, which are 
not always explicitly stated in the discussion of each 
particular problem in Aquinas' works but which are 
necessary for a complete understanding of St. Thomas' 
Christian philosophy. It contains a subject and 
proper name index. 
The following abbreviations are used in referring 
to Aquinas' writings: 
Figure 6. Abbreviations for Aquinas' writings. 
Summa Theologica ST 
Pars Prima First Part Ia 
Prima Secundae First Part of Second Part Ia IIae 
Secunda Secundae Second Part of Second Part IIa IIae 
Pars Tertia Third Part IIIa 
Supplementum Supplement Suppl. 
The Summa Theologica is divided into the above 
sections and also into questions (q) and articles (a) 
within these sections. Thus, a reference to ST, Ia 
IIae, q4, a3 would direct the reader to the Summa 
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Theologica, the First Part of the Second Part, 
question 4, article 3. 
The Summa Contra Gentiles (SG) is divided into 
books and chapters so that a reference to SG, 1, 3 
would mean the Summa Contra Gentiles, book 1, chapter 
3. The other works are divided into questions and 
articles so that a reference to De Potentia, 5, 3 
would refer one to De Potentia, question 5, article 3. 
The Summa Theologica, Summa Contra Gentiles, and other 
works such as De Potentia and De Anima also contain 
objections, which are hypothetical arguments which 
Aquinas poses against his own and then answers (ad) . 
Thus ST, Ia, 97, 2, ad I would mean that the quotation 
had been taken from the Summa Theologica, First Part, 
question 97, article 2, in the reply to the first 
objection. 
It should also be noted that Aquinas does not use 
inclusive language, using terms like "man" to denote 
"humanity." Though this paper does not change his 
words when quoting him, an effort has been made to 
employ inclusive language otherwise throughout the 
paper. 
His Work 
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The subjects about which Aquinas has written are 
vast and profound. It is impossible to give an 
adequate overview of his work but some of those things 
for which he is most well known are here presented 
(Helm, 1981, pp. 60, 61). 
Aquinas regarded all human knowledge as sensory 
in origin, data being derived from matter. But humans 
are able to take this understanding and abstract to 
the knowledge of the forms of matter. This replaced 
Augustine's view that intellectual illumination of 
form was more certain and reliable than sense 
impressions of matter. Aquinas saw the two working 
together. Much of Aquinas' writing attempts to 
explain how this concept, that all knowledge is 
sensory in origin, still allows one to know God. 
He made a distinction between sacred doctrine and 
philosophy, which will be covered in the next section. 
He did affirm that God's existence could be proven 
philosophically. His famous "Five Ways," five a 
posteriori arguments, are based on God's effects in 
the world, data which is accessible to the common 
person and not just the metaphysician. Aquinas says 
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God is known through His effects in nature and also in 
the revelation of Scripture, of which Aquinas was an 
eminent philosophical exigete. And yet Aquinas 
stressed how little and imperfectly God is known, that 
He is known only by analogy (i.e., Solomon's wisdom is 
like God's wisdom in some ways) and negation (i.e., 
God is not finite). Analogy is one of Aquinas' 
crucial concepts. 
He also distinguished between faith, opinion, and 
knowledge. Faith, which is personal and 
propositional, is stronger than opinion because it 
involves a firm assent to its object. But faith is 
less than knowledge because it lacks full 
comprehension. Religious faith is a disposition which 
comes by the grace of God. Aquinas' ethics stress the 
teleological character of human choice, distinguishing 
moral theology, which is from divinely revealed law, 
and natural law, which is accessible to everyone. 
St. Thomas affirms God as the uncreated "first 
cause" of all things, excepting evil which is a 
privation of goodness. As such, God is the first and 
only principle of reality upon whom all reality is 
based and contingent, and with regard to whom all 
Psychoanalytic Object-Relations 
81 
other realities are lesser. Therefore, God knowingly 
determines and determinantly knows all things, while 
allowing for human freedom and responsibility, in the 
eternal present. The concept of act and potency is 
crucial for Aquinas here as in other areas. 
By Leo XIII's 1879 encyclical, Roman Catholicism 
gave Aquinas' works official, though not exclusive, 
place in the Church's thinking. Protestants have 
repudiated some of Aquinas' speculative excesses and 
perceived biblical errors yet have affirmed his 
efforts in apologetics and philosophical theology. 
Some prominent modern Protestant theologians embrace 
Aquinas (Geisler, 1982; Vos, 1985). 
Method of Aquinas 
Writing Style 
St. Thomas' writing style fits the philosophical 
method he employs. He is precise not prolix, plain 
not pleonastic. His words are brief while his works 
are long. His style, unlike Augustine, is always 
"penny plain rather than twopence coloured" 
(Chesterton, 1956, p. 153). Yet he 
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very specially possessed the philosophy that 
inspires poetry; as he did so largely inspire 
Dante's poetry [which inspired T. s. Eliot]. And 
poetry without philosophy has only inspiration, 
or, in vulgar language, only wind. He had, so to 
speak, the imagination without the imagery. And 
even this is perhaps too sweeping. (Chesterton, 
1956, pp. 152, 153) 
The second thing that can be said about his 
writing is that it utilizes common sense. He is 
logical, not paradoxical. Chesterton believes that 
practical politics and abstract philosophies of the 
modern world which deviate from Aquinas in this way, 
do so to their detriment. 
Since the modern world began in the sixteenth 
century, nobody's system of philosophy has really 
corresponded to everybody's sense of reality; to 
what, if left to themselves, common men would 
call common sense. Each started with a paradox; 
a peculiar point of view demanding the sacrifice 
of what they would call a sane point of view. 
That is the one thing common to Hobbes and Hegel, 
to Kant and Bergson, to Berkeley and William 
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James. A man had to believe something that no 
normal man would believe, if it were suddenly 
propounded to his simplicity; as that law is 
above right, or right is outside reason, or 
things are only as we think them, or everything 
is relative to a reality that is not there. The 
modern philosopher claims, like a sort of 
confidence man, that if once we will grant him 
this, the rest will be easy; he will straighten 
out the world, if once he is allowed to give this 
one twist to the mind. Thomist philosophy 
is nearer than most philosophies to the mind of 
the man on the street. (p. 146, 147) 
Philosophical and Theoloqjcal Science 
It is difficult if not impossible to separate St. 
Thomas' philosophy from his theology because his 
purpose was certainly theological and his method 
employed the highest of philosophical devices. Here, 
his philosophical method will be emphasized. Of his 
theology, it can be said generally that he held to the 
text of the Scriptures as well as the doctrine of the 
church of his day as tested by his philosophical 
science. 
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In his philosophy Aquinas is unashamedly 
Aristotelian. St. Thomas was rigorous in testing his 
assumptions, painstaking in his observations of data, 
and ruthlessly logical in his analysis and 
interpretation of that data. And he begins, as does 
science of today, with the empirical data. In ST, Ia, 
78, 4, ad 4, he declared that everything that is in 
the intellect has been in the senses, that the mind 
knows only through sense knowledge but it knows more 
than sense knowledge (Aquinas, 1981, p. 396). This is 
quite different from those who might take a more 
mystical view, such as Plato or some modern 
philosophers, who say that the mind is informed from 
within. 
Aquinas, like Aristotle, used deduction, 
believing that true premises produce a true 
conclusion. Logic is based on reality not the other 
way around. He knew that no matter how many inductive 
premises are collected from data, deduction must be 
employed to reach a conclusion. There are no 
"interpra-facts," no data that explain or interpret 
themselves inductively apart from a deduction. 
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Chesterton says some moderns believe induction can 
replace deduction. 
But the process of deduction from the data is the 
same for the modern mind as for the medieval 
mind; and what is pompously called induction is 
simply collecting more of the data. . . But 
many modern people talk as if what they call 
induction were some magic way of reaching a 
conclusion, without using any of those horrid old 
syllogisms. But induction does not lead us to a 
conclusion. Induction only leads us to a 
deduction. . In this world there is nothing 
except a syllogism and a fallacy. (Chesterton, 
1970, pp. 153-155) 
What are some of the St. Thomas' assumptions 
regarding philosophy? Aquinas' first principles of 
knowledge, or epistemological assumptions, are as 
follows: the principle of identity, the principle of 
non-contradiction, the principle of excluded middle, 
the principle of causality, and the principle of 
finality (Geisler, 1980). A principle is that from 
which something follows. A cause is that from which 
something follows with dependence. As stated in ST, 
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I, 33, 1, a first principle is the first from which 
something follows. The following figure of the first 
principles is based on V Metaphysics, lect. 11; I 
Sentences, 19, 1, 1; II Sentences, 34, 1, 3; and On 
Power, II, 1 (Geisler, 1982) . 
Psychoanalytic Object-Relations 
87 
Figure 7. First principles. 
Principle Ontological 
Identity being is being 
Non-contradiction being is 
Excluded middle 
Causality 
Finality 
not non-being 
either being or 
non-being 
every contingent 
(finite) being 
is caused by 
another 
act communicates 
act, or being 
is finalized 
Epistemological 
being is 
intelligible 
contradictions 
cannot be 
simultaneously 
true 
either 
affirmation 
or negation 
is true 
every contingent 
proposition is 
caused 
(dependent) 
on another 
every agent acts 
for an end 
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On the origin of first principles, 'what' is 
known comes first, then 'how' it is known. Aquinas' 
De Anima, III, 4 states that all knowledge begins in 
sensation (Aquinas, 1984, p. 65f). But ST, Ia, 84, 6, 
adl states that there is also a need for an agent 
intellect to abstract (Aquinas, 1981, p. 428) . How is 
it that first principles are known from the senses? 
By means of agent intellect and natural knowledge. 
Natural knowledge is where agent intellect engages in 
an unconscious use of the first principles. It is the 
natural capacity of the mind existing without 
contents, structure without stuff, before sensation 
(Geisler, 1980). 
Having defined first principles it is important 
to see how Aquinas actually develops theology and 
philosophy upon this foundation. For instance, in XII 
Metaphysics, lecture 12, Aquinas posits, "The entire 
universe is one dominion and realm, governed by one 
ruler, who is the first mover, the first truth, the 
first good--God, blessed for ever and ever" (Gilby, 
1955, pp. 76, 77). Thomas Aquinas is well known for 
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his method of using philosophy and theology to do his 
work. This paper explores a topic, anthropology, in 
which he, of necessity, brings to bear truths from 
both philosophy and theology. How philosophy and 
theology articulate and inform each other is explained 
in Aquinas' words in the following from De Trinitate, 
ii, 3. 
The gifts of grace are added to us in order to 
enhance the gifts of nature, not to take them 
away. The native light of reason is not 
obliterated by the light of faith gratuitously 
shed on us. Hence Christian theology enlists the 
help of philosophy and the sciences. Mere 
reasoning, can never discover the truths which 
faith perceives; on the other hand, it cannot 
discover any disagreement between its own 
intrinsically natural truths and those divinely 
revealed. (Gilby, 1955, p. 7) 
Thus Aquinas sets philosophy (and science) and 
theology beside each other as complementary 
disciplines not contradictory. The "gifts of grace" 
known through theology enhance the "gifts of nature" 
known through philosophy and science. 
Psychoanalytic Object-Relations 
90 
He goes on, in De Trinitate, ii, 3, to describe 
and delimit the domains of theology and philosophy 
(including science) . "The principles of reason are 
the foundations of philosophy, the principles of faith 
are the foundation of Christian theology ... 
Nature is the prelude to grace. It is the abuse of 
science and philosophy which provokes statements 
against faith" (Gilby, 1955, p. 7). 
Aquinas then gives three uses for philosophy in 
theology: for proving religious presuppositions, for 
showing analogies between the realms of 
science/philosophy and religion, and for defending the 
faith. 
Accordingly Christian theology may call on 
philosophy to perform three offices. First, to 
demonstrate the groundwork of faith, for the 
truths of natural religion--for instance, that 
God exists, that there is one God, and so forth--
can be proved by philosophy and are presupposed 
to religious belief and are necessary elements in 
the science of faith, or Christian theology. 
Secondly, to declare analogies common to nature 
and grace; thus Augustine draws illustrations of 
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the Trinity from philosophical teachings. 
Thirdly, to resist attacks on faith, by showing 
that they are either wrongly conceived or at 
least unsupported and cannot be pressed. (Gilby, 
1955, p. 7, 8) 
Gardeil (1959) expresses Aquinas' doctrine of 
knowledge (epistemology) and the connection between 
empirical science and metaphysics in part as follows: 
This doctrine, to be sure, appeals in some 
measure to experience and observation. Indeed, 
it begins with knowledge as a fact of experience; 
but the experience is studied in its most general 
aspects and in terms of a metaphysics of being, 
especially of natural, that is, bodily being, 
which is the constant point of reference. 
It may be granted, then, that such a study 
holds out small attraction for anyone who intends 
at all costs to keep his inquiry on the empirical 
level. But if we want to probe beneath the 
surface, and if we have any curiosity at all as 
to the inner nature of knowledge, then we must 
come to the task prepared with metaphysical 
tools. Such a course is the more imperative 
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when, with the feeble light of human 
understanding, we try to penetrate the world of 
the spirits, whether of our own, which we can but 
faintly discern, or of God and the angels, which 
is wholly beyond our direct view. Before we can 
have some understanding of the workings of the 
spirit world, our notions from sense must be set 
to a metaphysical key; it is here above all, in 
this metaphysical transposition, that the 
principles of knowledge supplied by our former 
masters prove their truest and most abiding 
worth. (pp. 102, 103) 
Copelston (1970) compares the method of 
metaphysical science to the apprehension of the 
everyday world. 
It is not that the metaphysician discovers a new 
fact . . . in the way that an explorer may 
discover a hitherto unknown island or flower: it 
is rather that he makes explicit what is 
implicitly contained in our apprehension of 
actual things. [Metaphysical understanding] 
cannot be equivalent to a privileged mystical 
experience on the part of metaphysicians, a 
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conception which Aquinas certainly did not admit. 
Nor can it be equivalent to the communication of 
a piece of factual information to a select few. 
It would presumably be more akin to seeing 
something familiar 'for the first time' or 'in a 
new light. ' (pp. 103, 104) 
Anthropology 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines 
anthropology as, 1. the science of man and "2. 
teaching about the origin, nature, and destiny of man 
especially from the perspective of his relation to 
God" (1973, p. 49). It is this second definition to 
which we turn our attention. This paper defines 
anthropology as the theological and philosophical 
study of the person. The Greek word "anthropos" is 
the word which denotes "mankind," or better rendered 
"humankind," and does not refer to the gender "male" 
but to the race "human." 
What is a person? In ST, Ia, 29, 3, Aquinas says 
"Person signifies what is noblest in nature, namely a 
complete substance of an intellectual kind, " 
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(Aquinas, 1981, pp. 157, 158). And in ST, Ia, 29, 4, 
"Person [italics original] in general means an 
individual substance which is intelligent, individual, 
that is, single in itself and distinct from others. 
But human person also implies this body of flesh and 
bones and this soul . 
159. 
"(Aquinas, 1981, p. 158, 
G. K. Chesterton (1970) says that St. Thomas is 
foremost an anthropologist. 
Homo Sapiens [italics original] can only be 
considered in relation to Sapientia [italics 
original]; and only a book like that of St. 
Thomas is really devoted to the intrinsic idea of 
Sapientia [italics original]. . In this 
sense St. Thomas Aquinas, perhaps more than he is 
anything else, is a great anthropologist. (pp. 
159, 160) 
Anthropology is the topic addressed in the second part 
of this chapter. 
In this chapter, the following three parts on 
anthropology present Aquinas' view of what a person is 
(nature), how a person is put together (manner), and 
why there is a problem for the person (reason) . 
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Webster's first definition of "nature" is "the 
inherent character or basic constitution of a person 
or thing: essence" (1973, p. 766). By "manner" is 
meant the way or method, according to Webster, in 
which a person is structured (Webster, 1973, p. 700). 
"Reason" is defined by Webster as "a statement offered 
in explanation or justification" (1973, p. 962). The 
first part, then, discusses the person's nature in 
terms of the image of God, the second speaks of the 
manner in which a person is a soul/body unity, and the 
third shows the reason for there being a problem, that 
of separation from God. 
Wbat is a Person--Nature? 
Introduction to the Person as Relational 
For Aquinas, intellect, the ability to know, is 
the highest of all the abilities possessed by 
humanity. Here he affirms that the highest use of 
this highest ability is in relationship with God. 
Aquinas states in the first paragraph of the first 
chapter of his work on salvation in Summa Contra 
Gentiles that "man's perfect good is that he somehow 
know God" (Aquinas, 1975b, p. 35). His chapter 
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expands on this theme with the ways that God has given 
humans to know Him, ways that God has given "out of a 
superabundant goodness, therefore, so that man might 
have a firmer knowledge of Him, " (Aquinas, 
1975b, p. 36). He states in the Summa Contra 
Gentiles, book three, 120, 10, on providence that 
"man's ultimate felicity consists solely in the 
enjoyment of Him" (Aquinas, 1975a, p. 136). 
Aquinas begins his prologue to the first part of 
the second part of the Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, 
prologue, by affirming that man is made to the image 
of God, Homo ad imaginem Dei factus, that "the 
ultimate explanation of our being lies in its being 
kindred with God" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 583). The 
familial analogy, calling it "kindred," is here called 
upon to describe this relationship with God. And this 
fact of relationship, he declares, is the absolute 
explication of what it means to be human. 
In Marquette University Professor James Robb's 
(1984) translation of Questions on the Soul, or De 
Anima, he begins by saying, "I dedicate this volume to 
my friends and to my students, who are also friends, 
since it is from them that I have over the years 
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learned and continue to learn that if through wisdom 
we can be united to God in friendship, then it is also 
true that through deep and continuing friendships we 
may make progress in our pursuit of wisdom" 
(dedicatory leaf) . Robb asserts that, "Aquinas treats 
human beings as incarnate spirits, spiritual beings 
who, incarnate in the world of space and time, are 
constantly transcending the limits of nature through 
knowledge, love and friendship" (Aquinas, 1984, 
dedicatory leaf). For St. Thomas and Thomists alike, 
the use of the person's highest human ability, 
intellect, in having a relationship with God and 
others is the ultimate essence of being human. 
Relationship defines a person's existence, it 
constitutes who one is. 
Image of God as Relational 
That the human person is like the divine person 
is revealed in Genesis 1:26 where God says, "Let Us 
make man in our image, according to Our likeness; 
n Augustine, Bonaventure, and Aquinas base their 
anthropology on this verse. Before delving into the 
image one should know something about the original. 
It is important to know more about God. Aquinas says, 
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in ST, Ia, 30, 1, that "Person [italics original] in 
God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine 
nature" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 160-161). Before this 
sentence, in ST, Ia, 29, 4, he makes some supporting 
statements about the relationship with the trinity and 
the nature of God. 
To inquire into the meaning of personality in 
general is one question, to inquire into the 
meaning of divine personality is another. Person 
[italics original] in general means an individual 
substance which is intelligent, individual, that 
is, single in itself and distinct from others. 
But human person also implies this body of flesh 
and bones and this soul: these are the 
individuating principles for men, but not for 
every kind of person. 
Now distinctions in God arise from relations 
of origin. A relation in God is not, as it is 
with us, an accident modifying a subject, but the 
divine nature itself, and existing as a complete 
substance. As Deity is God, so divine fatherhood 
is the Father. Divine personality, then, 
signifies a relation existing as a complete 
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substance. Thus a relation is denoted, which is 
a substance, a hypostasis subsisting in, and 
really identical with the divine nature. 
(Aquinas, 1981, p. 157-160) 
This last sentence equates the nature of God with 
the relationship existing in the trinity. Here, the 
very nature of God is seen as relational. This is 
consistent with the Scriptural phrase which God spoke 
in the plural referring to Himself, "Let Us make man 
in our image, according to Our likeness; " (.Ille. 
Open Bible, 1979, p. 2). 
Having briefly looked at the divine nature, what 
does it mean for a human to be the image of God? 
Aquinas says humans are the image of God in two ways, 
reflecting God's divine nature, especially in 
intelligence, and the trinity of Persons in God, 
especially in being relational. In De Veritate, X, 2, 
ad 5, he says, "Mind is made to the image of God when 
he is mindful of him and bearing him; mind is present 
to itself and to God before it is roused by ideas 
taken from sense" (Gilby, 1955, p. 166). Aquinas 
usually explains each of these two ways in terms of 
relationship, usually familial. 
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Other passages from St. Thomas deal with this 
subject (cf. ST, Ia, 93, 4). The following is from 
Sentences, III, 10, 2, 2, 3. 
Man is made to the image of God, because he is 
created with an intelligence. Only intelligent 
beings are said to be made to his image; they 
only can be called his sons, and can be adopted 
through grace. Adoption goes further, for a 
right to the inheritance is implied. God's 
heritage is his own happiness, of which only 
intelligent creatures are capable, though they 
have no strict title to it from the fact of their 
creation; such happiness is a gift, the gift of 
the Spirit. Sharing of possessions is not 
enough: there must be a sharing of the heritage. 
And so the adoption of creatures means their 
communion in divine happiness. 
Christ should not be termed God's son by 
adoption, for he is begotten eternally by the 
Father, and his divine nature has the heritage by 
right, not by additional concession: "all things 
whatsoever that the Father has are mine" [John 
16:15). (Gilby, 1955, pp. 155, 156) 
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In the above quote, a human's intelligence and 
ability to relate to God as adopted children 
constitute being the image of God. That this adoption 
means "their communion in divine happiness" 
underscores the relationship aspect of this image. 
The trinity is alluded to in the last paragraph of the 
quote. It highlights the similarity and difference 
humanity has with Christ in the relationship within 
the trinity of the Father and Christ. The similarity 
is that each is a child of God, while the difference 
is that Christ is a natural child and humans are 
adopted. Each is afforded full privileges of 
sonship/daughterhood up to the full measure of his/her 
nature, Christ being infinite and humans being finite. 
The following is from the Summa Theologica, Ia, 
33, 3. It carries the theme of the relationship in 
the trinity as that which humans are, that which is 
the image of God. 
A term is primarily attributed to a subject which 
possesses its full meaning, not something else 
which bears some resemblance: what is borrowed 
comes back to what is owned. Lion primarily 
means the animal, not a lionheart or any other 
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sort of human lion. Now fatherhood and sonship 
at full strength are the Father's and the Son's 
who are one in nature and glory. Creatures are 
not related to God with the utmost sonship, 
because they and the creator are not of the same 
nature. 
Nevertheless there are varying degrees of 
resemblance, and the more perfect a thing the 
closer it is to divine sonship. God is called 
the father of non-rational creatures because they 
are like his footprints; they resemble him 
because they are his traces: "Hath rain a 
father? Or who hath begotten the drops of dew?" 
[Job 38:28) Rational creatures are like him 
because they are his images: "Is not he thy 
father that hath possessed thee? Hath he not 
created and established thee" [Deuteronomy 32:6)? 
Of some he is father by likeness of grace, for 
they are called adopted sons because born of 
grace: "The Spirit himself beareth witness with 
our spirit that we are the children of God, and 
if children, then heirs also" [Romans 8:16, 17]. 
And of others by a greater likeness, for they 
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have entered into their inheritance of glory: 
"We rejoice in hope of the glory of God" [Romans 
5: 2] . 
Perfect fatherhood, then, is a relation of 
Person to Person, and thence it is derived to 
include God's relationship to creatures. 
(Aquinas, 1981, pp. 174, 175) 
In each of the above comparisons of God to 
creation, family relationships are called upon as 
analogy. Aquinas is saying, by the consistent use of 
the relational references in every one of the 
Scripture citations above, that these relational 
concepts are more than analogies used for 
illustration. They indicate ontological truth, 
reality about the nature of human beings as 
relational, rooted in the very nature of God as a 
triune relation. It is fitting then that human 
nature, as the image of God, would be so described. 
That humans are the image of God by being 
relational becomes more difficult to understand when 
one considers the physical part of a person, the body, 
as opposed to the soul. Is it only the soul that is 
like God? How do the soul and body relate? If humans 
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are relational, how are they put together for relating 
to themselves, the world, and God? This is the 
purview of the next section. 
How is a Person put together for Relationship--the 
Manner? 
Introduction 
How the soul and body relate to each other is 
important because it affects one's view of how humans 
have relationship. There are two possible extreme 
views of how the body and soul relate to each other. 
One is to say that the 'real' human is the soul which 
inhabits the body, the body being either an instrument 
or a prisoner of the soul. This is known as dualism 
and is the view of Plato. The other is to reduce the 
soul to the body. This is known as monism and is the 
view of atomists, materialists, and some 
epiphenomenalists. 
One can say in general that those philosophers 
who have concentrated their attention on the 
higher psychic activities and on man's religious 
and moral life have inclined to some form of 
dualism, while those who have paid special 
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attention to the dependence of psychic processes 
on physical conditions have inclined to a 
monistic interpretation of the relation of soul 
to body. (Copelston, 1970, pp. 157, 158) 
Is there then a truth which strikes a middle course 
between the extremes? Yes, and St. Thomas proposes 
such a one, combining principles from Aristotelian 
psychology and Christian theology. 
Soul-Bod:t Unity 
For Aquinas, as stated in ST, Ia, 75, 1, 'soul' 
is equivalent to Aristotle's 'psyche,' and is "the 
first principle of life in living things about us" 
(Aquinas, 1981, pp. 363, 364). G. K. Chesterton, in 
describing Aquinas' view of what a person is, states 
that 
For him the point is always that Man is not a 
balloon going up into the sky, nor a mole 
burrowing merely in the earth; but rather a thing 
like a tree, whose roots are fed from the earth, 
while its highest branches seem to rise almost to 
the stars. (1970, p. 164) 
Aquinas himself says in De Spiritualibus Creaturis, 3, 
ad 2, 
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An excellent form brings all and more than lesser 
forms can provide. Matter is as richly endowed 
by a higher form as by a lower; in addition it 
also becomes the proper subject of complementary 
perfection. Thus our body is both a 
physiological and a psychological object, is both 
organic and charged with human interests and 
values. (Gilby, 1955, p. 96) 
Aquinas' foundational use of Aristotle is clearly 
seen in his formulation of the unity of body and soul. 
Aristotle solved the dilemma by formulating a middle 
ground between materialism and dualism. 
If, as Aristotle was convinced, the materialism 
of the ancients was unable to explain the 
distinctive characteristics that living things 
display both in their structure and activity, and 
if, as he was equally convinced, Platonic dualism 
sundered the unity of these beings to the point 
of no repair, clearly, then, what was needed was 
to find a new and more comprehensive 
interpretation, one that would account for all 
the facts at hand. Accordingly, Aristotle has 
recourse to the doctrine of hylomorphism, 
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declaring the soul to be neither more nor less 
than the form of the body. With that, the 
dilemma between materialism and dualism 
collapses. (Gardeil, 1959, p. 35) 
That the soul of a person is the "form of the 
body" is the great philosophical and theological 
understanding to which Aquinas subscribes. It is a 
short four word phrase of deep and inestimable aid in 
defining humanity. Beyond the scope of this paper 
would be an account of the many attempts made in 
history to explain the relationship between the soul 
and body. What Aquinas has accomplished is a marriage 
of the rational and the revealed concerning the makeup 
of a person. That the soul is the form of the body is 
but the first of his contributions simply stated. St. 
Thomas sums up Aristotle's argument on the definition 
of the soul, in Aristotle, De Anima, II, lect. 1, no. 
221, as follows. 
Since, then, substance may be taken in three 
ways, namely, as composite, matter, and form and 
since the soul is neither the composite, which is 
the body having life, nor matter, which is the 
body as the subject of life, we are compelled by 
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the logic of division to say that the soul is 
substance in the manner of form, being the form 
of a particular kind of body, namely, of a 
physical body having life in potency. (Gardeil, 
1959, p. 33) 
First, the soul is "the first act (or form) of a 
physical (natural) organic body having life in 
potency," says Aristotle in De Anima, II, lect. 1, no. 
221 (Gardeil, 1959, p. 33). Second, Aristotle says in 
De Anima, II, lect. 2, no. 273, that the soul may be 
defined as the principle of its activities, the soul 
is "the first principle by which we live, sense, move, 
and understand" (Gardeil, 1959, p. 34). 
Aquinas' De Anima, 1, ad 1, deals supremely with 
the question of the soul-body unity. He says that 
Plato, with whom Aquinas disagrees, 
holds that a soul not only subsists per se but 
even that it possesses in itself the fullness of 
a specific nature. For he held that the full 
nature of the species is in the soul, defining a 
human being not as something composed of soul and 
body but as a soul using a body, and thus the 
relation of the soul to its body is that of a 
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sailor to his ship or of a clothed man to his 
garments. However this position cannot be 
maintained; for it is clear that that by which 
the body lives is its soul. Now to live is the 
"to be" of living things. Therefore the soul is 
that by which a human body actually exists; but 
to confer being is a characteristic of a form. 
Therefore, a human soul is the form of its body. 
(Aquinas, 1984, p. 47) 
He carries this analogy further by saying that 
when a body is dead, a corpse, no longer living 
(separated from the soul), it no longer carries on its 
specific nature, that is, the eye no longer sees. 
This shows that there is a stronger connection between 
soul and body than sailor and ship. When the sailor 
leaves the ship, the ship does not suffer corruption. 
But when the soul leaves the body, the body suffers 
corruption such that human nature is incomplete. "For 
a thing is not complete in nature unless it possesses 
those things which are demanded for the proper 
operation of its nature" (Aquinas, 1984, p. 48) . 
Therefore, one must maintain that the soul is an 
entity, as being able to subsist per se [italics 
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original] but not as possessing in itself a 
complete specific nature, but rather as 
completing human nature insofar as it is the form 
of its body; and thus at one and the same time it 
is a form and an entity (Aquinas, 1984, p. 47). 
Aquinas shows that "from the operation of the 
human soul the mode of existence can be known" 
(Aquinas, 1984, p. 48). This means that now the soul 
operates says much about its makeup, about what it is, 
about its existence. That is to say, the object of 
its actions characterizes those actions and explains 
the nature of the subject. This is seen in the 
hierarchy of various forms of matter. The essential 
operation of various forms lower than persons gives a 
clue as to the principle employed by that form. The 
higher the form, the more it is like and approximates 
higher principles. 
For instance, elements are the lowest forms and 
those closest to matter. Their operations only go so 
far as general active and passive qualities. The next 
higher form operates with higher principles. These 
are compounds which, over and above the abilities of 
elements, have operations derived from the celestial 
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bodies, such as magnets attract iron. And this is not 
due to an accidental quality or state such as heat or 
cold but due to the nature of the compound's form 
itself, that of participating in celestial power. The 
following is a chart derived from Aquinas' discussion 
on this topic. It lists the form in ascending order, 
lower to higher, along with its characteristic 
operation and principle. Important to note is that 
each succeeding form possesses the operation and 
principle of the ones before it. 
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Figure 8. Hierarchy of various forms of matter. 
Form Operation Principle 
element compactness active/passive qualities 
compound magnetism celestial power 
plants moving like celestial body movers 
animals knowing (mater.) like substance of movers 
human knowing (immater.) like substance of angels 
What is the meaning of this? Perhaps crudely it may 
be said that "if it walks and quacks like a duck, it 
is a duck," or "a tree is known by its fruit." A 
thing is known by what it does, a form is known by its 
operation according to its inherent principle. 
Aquinas sums up in the following way. 
Thus in such a fashion from the operation of the 
human soul the mode of its very existence can be 
known. For insofar as a soul possesses an 
operation which transcends material things, its 
very existence is raised above and does not 
depend on its body. But insofar as a soul by 
nature acquires its immaterial knowledge from 
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what is material, it is clear that the 
fulfillment of its nature cannot be achieved 
apart from union with a body. For a thing is not 
complete in nature unless it possesses those 
things which are demanded for the proper 
operation of that nature. In this way, 
therefore, a human soul insofar as it is united 
to its body as its form still possesses an act of 
existence which is elevated above the body and 
does not depend on it; clearly then this soul is 
constituted on the boundary line between 
corporeal and separate substances. (Aquinas, 
1984, p. 48) 
As stated in this section above, St. Thomas' 
incorporation of Aristotle's "the soul is the form of 
the body" is but the first of his contributions to the 
discussion. To this philosophical position he adds a 
very important theological understanding. He declares 
that the soul is not only the form of the body but is 
also capable of existence without the body--it is 
immortal. 
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Wby is there a Problem in Relationship--the Reason? 
Introduction 
Aquinas says, II de Malo, II, that sin is what 
obstructs one's relationship with God; "Sin is like an 
obstacle interposed between the soul and God: your 
iniquities have separated between you and God [italics 
original] [Isaiah 59:2]" (Gilby, 1955, p. 139). The 
Isaiah passage goes on to say "And your sins have 
hidden His face from you, so that He does not hear" 
(The Open BibJe, 1979, p. 678). 
In ST, IIa, IIae, 94, 1-3, Aquinas asserts that, 
on the part of the sin itself, idolatry is the most 
grievous sin, idolatry belonging to superstition, 
which is "to exceed the due mode of divine worship, 
and this is done chiefly when divine worship is given 
to whom it should not be given" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 
1589-1592; Gilby, 1955, p. 143). In ST, IIIa, 3, ad 
1, he says, "Man fell back to earth by deserting God" 
(Aquinas, 1981, p. 1589-1592; Gilby, 1955, p. 143) 
Separation and Fragmentation Caused by Sin 
Aquinas says, in ST, IIIa, I, ad 3, that 
"sinfulness abandons the art of divine wisdom and the 
plan of divine goodness" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 3003). 
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In, IV de Malo, 2, Aquinas speaks of sin as a "turning 
away from" and a "turning to:" 
The human quality of the motions of hands and 
eyes is communicated by the will, and it is thus 
that physiological and psychological processes 
are invested with morality. Gestures reveal what 
the will is like; if it be disordered, then it 
produces a corresponding outside effect and 
impression. We commit a sinful act by turning to 
a temporal attraction without being duly directed 
to our last end. In effect we turn away from 
eternal blessing. There is a turning to, and a 
turning away; the first, the self-indulgence and 
the wasteful love, represents the material 
element in sin; the second, the aversion and the 
hate, represents the formal element, formal 
because morality is defined with reference to our 
last end. The sin of our first parents 
contained these two elements, the formal element 
of turning away from God, and the material 
element of turning to vanity. We may draw 
an analogy with actual and personal sin: there 
the turning away from God is formal, and the 
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turning to creatures is material. Likewise 
original sin; it estranges us from God, and 
commits us to this world. (Gilby, 1955, p. 124) 
That people turn from God to vanity, he says in 
IV de Malo, ad I, i, is both natural and unnatural for 
humans. 
Natural to man [italics original] has a double 
ring, natural to animal--and so we can desire 
anything attractive to our senses; and natural to 
human--and so we desire pleasure according to the 
measure set by reason: thus the concupiscence 
which is ready to scrap reasonableness for what 
takes our fancy is against human nature . . 
(Gilby, 1955, p. 126). 
Thus, in ST, Ia IIae, 71, 1, he says sin is 
against rational human nature. He also states that 
sin is against the natural divine order of things. 
"Sin, the direct opposite of an act of virtue, is a 
disordered activity; vice, the direct opposite of 
virtue, is the condition of a thing out of its proper 
natural bearings" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 897). 
Based on the fact that sin is against the natural 
order of things, Aquinas goes on to note, in ST, Ia 
Psychoanalytic Object-Relations 
117 
IIae, 72, 1, that sin tends toward a split in the 
person, a disunity and chaos rather than unity and 
coherence. 
A good man's purposes are unified, a sinner's 
scattered. Virtues make us bent on pursing the 
reasonable life; prudence links them together in 
a common plan of rightful activity. All purposes 
then converge. Not so with sinful intentions. 
For the sinner does not set himself to depart 
from the rules of reasonable living. He sets out 
to indulge himself with something that attracts 
him, and it is this which gives a positive tone 
to what he does. Variegated are the attractions 
for whose sake he is ready to turn away from 
right reason; there is no essential combination 
between them, one with another, indeed sometimes 
they are conflicting. Since they stamp specific 
character on sins it follows that sins are not 
all in alliance together. The life of sin is a 
fall from coherence to chaos; the life of virtue 
a climb from the many to the One. (Aquinas, 1981, 
p. 902, 903) 
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This exchanging of worship of the one and only 
first principle of reality, God, for worship of 
multiple lesser realities separates humans from the 
holy, uncreated God and joins them in an unholy 
alliance to created beings. 
Separation and Fragmentation Caused by the Sin of 
Idolatry 
In ST, Ila, IIae, 94, 1-3, Aquinas says idolatry 
is the most grievous sin, idolatry belonging to 
superstition, which is "to exceed the due mode of 
divine worship, and this is done chiefly when divine 
worship is given to whom it should not be given" 
(Aquinas, 1981, p. 1589-1592). Aquinas stated that 
divine worship should only be given to whom it should 
be given. Thus, he said in I Sentences, I. iii, c., 
ad 3, 4, created things, animals, man, angels, images, 
and so forth should not be worshiped because only the 
creator should be worshiped. "In themselves creatures 
are no obstacles to eternal happiness. We make them 
so, by abusing them and by committing ourselves to 
them as if they were our ultimate goal" (Gilby, 1955, 
p. 130). 
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Book three of the Summa Contra Gentiles, 120, 23-
25 says the following: 
Therefore, it is clear from what we have said 
that the cult of latria [that is, giving ultimate 
worship] is due to the one, highest God only. 
Thus it is said in Exodus (22:20): "He that 
sacrif iceth to the gods shall be put to death, 
save only to the Lord;" and in Deuteronomy 
(6:13): "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and 
shalt serve Hirn only." And in Romans (1:22-23) 
it is said of the Gentiles: "For, professing 
themselves to be wise, they became fools, and 
they changed the glory of the incorruptible God 
into the likeness of the image of a corruptible 
man and of birds, and of fourfooted beasts and of 
creeping things;" and later (verse 25; Douay 
modified) : "Who changed the truth of God into a 
lie and worshiped and served the creature rather 
than the Creator, Who is God above all blessed 
for ever." So, since it is unfitting for the 
cult of latria to be offered to any other being 
than the first principle of things, and since to 
incite to unworthy deeds can only be the work of 
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a badly disposed rational creature, it is evident 
that men have been solicited by the urging of 
demons to develop the aforesaid unworthy cults, 
and these demons have been presented in place of 
God as objects of men's worship because they 
craved divine honor. Hence it is said in the 
Psalm (95:5): "All the gods of the Gentiles are 
devils;" and in I Corinthians (10:20): "the 
things which the heathens sacrifice, they 
sacrifice to devils and not to God." Therefore, 
since this is the chief intent of divine law: 
that man be subject to God and that he should 
offer special reverence to Him, not merely in his 
heart, but also orally and by bodily works, so 
first of all, in Exodus 20, where the divine law 
is promulgated, the cult of many gods is 
forbidden when it is said: "Thou shalt not have 
strange gods before me" and "thou shalt not make 
to thyself a graven thing, nor any likeness." 
(Aquinas, 1975a, p. 140, 141) 
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Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced Thomas Aquinas' work, his 
method, and his groundbreaking formulations on 
anthropology. Three aspects of anthropology were 
discussed, that persons are relational by virtue of 
their being the image of God, that the soul and body 
are unitary, and that the great problem of humankind 
is separation from God, especially through idolatry. 
The next chapter synthesizes integrative issues 
of Aquinas' theological discipline of anthropology and 
Fairbairn's psychological discipline of personality 
theory. After a comparison of their work, further 
suggestions are offered on maintaining a dialogue 
between theology and psychology toward an integrative 
paradigm. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS TOWARD A DIALOGUE 
Introduction 
The author's plan in this paper has been to begin 
a dialogue between psychoanalytic object relations 
psychology and Western Orthodox Christian theology, 
with Fairbairn representing British object relations 
theory and Aquinas representing Western Orthodox 
Christianity. In the first chapter, the stage was set 
by sharpening the focus, discussing the method, and 
defining the scope and thesis of this paper. An 
analysis of W. R. D. Fairbairn's writings constituted 
the second chapter of the paper, followed by an 
analysis of the relevant data from the theology of 
Thomas Aquinas in the third chapter. 
From the exposition in chapters two and three, a 
common principle emerged from the writings of each 
man. This principle acts as a unifying theme for both 
domains, psychology and theology, and is the subject 
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of this last chapter. It is the author's intent in 
this chapter to build on what has been found to be 
implicit in Fairbairn and Aquinas thus far. What is 
this unifying theme? It is the primacy of 
relationship. 
Reyiew of Chapters Two and Three 
The plan of Chapters Two and Three followed the 
same format. The following figure illustrates that 
each chapter was divided into two parts, an 
introduction and the study of the person, with sub-
points under each. 
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Figure 9. Overview of Chapters Two and Three. 
• Introduction 
-Work 
-Method 
• The Person 
1 What is a 
person?-Nature 
2 How made?-
Manner 
FAIRBAIRN (CH 2) 
Fairbairn 
•Lit. review and 
his thought 
•Psychoanalytic 
science 
Personality 
Theory 
•Relationship 
seeking 
•Pristine, unitary 
ego 
3 Why problem?- •Split ego 
Reason 
AQUINAS (CH 3) 
Aquinas 
•Lit. review+ 
his thought 
•Philosophy/ 
Theology 
Anthropology 
•Image as 
relational 
•Soul/body unity 
•Separation and 
idolatry 
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In the introduction, each man's work was highlighted, 
through a literature review and brief overview of his 
thought, followed by discussion of each theorist's 
method, "psychoanalytic science" for Fairbairn and 
"philosophy and theology" for Aquinas. 
In the second part of each chapter, the study of 
the person, "personality theory" for Fairbairn and 
"anthropology" for Aquinas, was approached by posing 
three questions. The first question, "What is a 
person?," investigated the nature of a person. The 
answer for Fairbairn is that a person is relationship 
seeking and for Aquinas is that a person is made in 
the image of God, which is relational. The second 
question, "How is a person made?," investigated the 
manner in which a person is put together. For 
Fairbairn, the answer is the pristine, unitary ego, 
while Aquinas affirms the soul/body unity. The third 
question, "Why is there problem?," investigated the 
reason a person has a problem. Fairbairn's answer is 
splitting of the ego and Aquinas' is separation and 
idolatry. 
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Preview of this Chapter 
First, an exposition is made on Fairbairn's use 
of the sacred and Aquinas' use of the secular. 
Second, a comparative analysis of the work of 
Fairbairn and Aquinas is set forth. 
The Sacred in Fairbairn and the Secular in Aquinas 
In Chapter Three, in the section on method, it 
was demonstrated the great extent to which Aquinas 
went to integrate the secular and sacred. He stated 
that "the gifts of grace are added to us in order to 
enhance the gifts of nature, not to take them away. 
. Hence Christian theology enlists the help of 
philosophy and the sciences" (Gilby, 1955, p. 7). 
Having previously established Aquinas as an 
integrator of the sacred and secular in his own right, 
it is the task here to demonstrate Fairbairn's secular 
work as containing a core of theological integration. 
If each man is found to be an integrator of the sacred 
and secular within his own work, then it would seem 
reasonable that, taken together, there would be more 
points available for comparison. 
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Fairbairn's exposure and adherence to 
Christianity are well documented. As a boy he 
attended church with his parents every Sunday, both 
morning and evening. He seemed to prefer Episcopalian 
services to Presbyterian. Sutherland (1989) makes 
mention of young Ronald's "practical Christianity," 
citing his work in clubs and organizations serving the 
deprived parts of the community. "That his marked 
altruistic and religious feelings were merged with his 
whole upbringing is clear ." (p. 5). 
By age 18, Fairbairn had decided to become a 
clergyman, as the journal entry on his 21st birthday 
indicates. Fairbairn mentions he is not the humble 
servant only of King George, "but also of Jesus 
Christ." Fairbairn writes in his personal journal, 
"True Christianity ought to satisfy every legitimate 
instinct and aspiration. It ought to be a working and 
workable philosophy of life for man and boy, matron 
and maiden; it ought to be adaptable to the condition 
of schoolroom and football field, of off ice and golf-
course, of factory and home I have decided to 
devote my life to the cause of religion; but may it be 
a manly, healthy, whole-hearted strong religion, 
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appealing to enthusiasm of youth as well as the 
quiescence of old age -- in other words may it be a 
Christlike religion" (Sutherland, 1989, pp. 6, 7). 
Shortly thereafter, Fairbairn pursued Hellenistic 
studies before taking a degree in divinity at London 
University. World War I took him to Jerusalem, where 
his varied reading resulted in a newfound interest in 
medical psychology. By the time he returned home his 
earlier plans, involving vocational ministry, had 
changed. In January, 1919, he commenced a four-year 
training program in medicine, intending to become a 
psychotherapist upon completion. 
By year two of his program, Fairbairn began 
reading Freud and Jung. Concurrently, he initiated a 
personal analysis with an E. H. Connell, whom 
Sutherland (1989) describes as "a very full-blooded 
Christian" (p. 7). An analysis with Ernest Jones 
followed, ensuring that, as he began seeing his own 
patients, Fairbairn would be well-entrenched in 
classical Freudian orthodoxy. 
While Sutherland (1989) describes Fairbairn's 
change of career as abandoning the church (p. 12), 
there is no evidence that Fairbairn's interest and 
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commitment to religion diminished simply because he 
pursued an alternate livelihood. One can see that 
Fairbairn considered the two disciplines not as 
mutually exclusive, but complementary. In fact, 
Sutherland (1989) says that "one matter he never 
raised was his continuing religious convictions. 
Though forsaking the career of a clergyman, he had 
remained a regular churchgoer, especially to its main 
festivals" (p. 31). His theological experience, 
integrated in such a fashion as to be reflected in 
behavior, had no small effect on his theory and 
practice. 
In his 1955 paper, Fairbairn discussed the 
patient who seeks psychotherapeutic help. What that 
person seeks is "not so much health as salvation from 
his past, from bondage to his (internal) bad objects, 
from the burden of guilt, and from spiritual death. 
His search thus corresponds in detail to the religious 
quest" (p. 155-6). Fairbairn's 1927 paper on the 
religious fantasies of a female patient shows his 
acceptance of a normal religious experience as well as 
a neurotic one. This further demonstrates that 
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Fairbairn's theological, or sacred, beliefs were 
inherent in his emphasis on relationship. 
Comparative Analysis of Fairbairn and Aquinas 
In this first section, a schematic of the major 
parallels in Fairbairn and Aquinas is provided. In 
the second section, a comparative analysis is made of 
each man's literary and scientific method and of each 
one's contribution to the study of the person. In the 
third section, based on the comparison of the work of 
Fairbairn and Aquinas, implications and suggestions 
for further research are given. 
Parallels Diagrammed 
Figure 9, reproduced here from the introduction 
to this chapter, notes the parallels between the 
thought of Fairbairn and that of Aquinas as presented 
in Chapters Two and Three respectively. 
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Fi~ure 9. Overview of Chapters Two and Three. 
• Introduction 
-Work 
-Method 
• The Person 
1 What is a 
person?-Nature 
2 How made?-
Manner 
FAIRBAIRN (CH 2) 
Fairbairn 
•Lit. review and 
his thought 
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Personality 
Theory 
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seeking 
•Pristine, unitary 
ego 
3 Why problem?- •Split ego 
Reason 
AQUINAS (CH 3) 
Aquinas 
•Lit. review+ 
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Theology 
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idolatry 
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In this section of Chapter Four, the topics identified 
in the above figure serve as an outline for comparing 
the views of the two men, beginning with each 
theorist's method. Then the topic of the person is 
broached, comparing Fairbairn and Aquinas' answers to 
the questions of what a person is, how she/he is made, 
and why there is a problem. 
Method of Fairbairn and Aquinas 
Each was precise and plain in writing. Each had 
a dedication to systematic analysis of detail. Each 
was trained in philosophy and theology. These 
qualities assure that their sacred and secular 
assumptions and interpretation of data are well 
thought through according to the integrity of their 
method and the congruity of their professional 
disciplines. This is especially true of their study 
of the person, a topic which so necessarily 
intertwines secular and sacred, objectivity and 
subjectivity, corporeal and spiritual. 
They were both scientists of rigorous discipline, 
dedicating their lives to the art of spinning theory 
from existential substance; that is, from experience. 
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The data they used was experience itself, perceived 
through the senses--for Aquinas, everyday experience; 
and for Fairbairn, clinical psychotherapy. Aquinas 
employed analogy in explaining his theory, bridging 
the gap between concrete and abstract. Fairbairn used 
case examples to demonstrate the connection of data 
with theory. 
Each has been criticized by modern readers for 
not having given enough clarifying examples. Aquinas' 
writings were described as having "imagination without 
imagery" (Chesterton, 1956, p. 152). Fairbairn's 
writing style has been seen as abstract and 
systematized (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 153). 
Aquinas was exhaustive in his approach, seemingly 
attempting to "tie up all loose ends," but without 
equal clarity on every point. Fairbairn was more 
general in his coverage, leaving some implications to 
further interpretation and elaboration, and thus 
leaving some lack of clarity on issues. If their 
writings are heavy on theory, it is not because they 
were light on data collection, but because of their 
abstract writing style and the complexity of their 
subject matter--humanity. 
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Their style is part of the meaning, the medium 
part of the message. Scientific scrutiny of the data, 
analyzed and reassessed, is the process resulting in 
distillation into theoretical formulation. Aquinas 
and Fairbairn allow the reader in on the process of 
inquiry, thus documenting the legitimacy of their 
method, yet therefore sometimes taking away from the 
simplicity of direct explanation. 
Aquinas and Fairbairn each drew from tradition in 
both sacred and secular realms as well as from newer 
ideas, including their own discoveries. Fairbairn 
drew on the tradition of Freud, but also incorporated 
the newer theories of Klein, and combined this with 
his own clinical observations. Aquinas drew on the 
church fathers and Scripture, yet infused their 
thinking with the philosophy of Aristotle, and added 
his own logical analysis of experience. In so doing, 
each man forged an amalgam never before manufactured 
and which has demonstrated a strength and durability 
to stand the test of time. 
Perhaps the key element common to both Fairbairn 
and Aquinas is their dedication to truth, the 
adherence to reality. This represents a philosophical 
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presupposition, an assumption to scientific practice 
which is brought to the data and found in the warp and 
woof of inductive and deductive data interpretation. 
That they agree on this matter is an important 
principle to the assertion that the two separate 
theorists may be integrated together. It also has 
implications as to how each one in himself integrated 
the secular and the sacred. 
Each theorist started with the empirical data, 
inductively, and then moved to interpretation, 
deductively. But the goal in all of this was the 
discovery of reality, the way things are, not the 
spinning of intriguing philosophical ideas. Fairbairn 
said that science provides a picture of reality by way 
of an intellectual construct (deduction) of various 
phenomena (induction) (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 376). 
Aquinas said that everything in the intellect has been 
in the senses, the mind knowing only through sense 
knowledge (induction) but knowing more than sense 
knowledge (deduction) (Aquinas, 1981, p. 396). Each 
man set the notions of sense to a metaphysical key. 
Each man strove to explain reality through 
logical reasoning. Aquinas said that logic is based 
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on reality, not the other way around (Chesterton, 
1956, pp. 153-155). Fairbairn said that object 
relations theory corresponds more closely with the 
psychological data and possesses more explanatory 
value from a purely scientific point of view than 
Freud's psychology (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 377). 
That each man was dedicated to the adherence to 
truth through the discovery of reality is also evident 
in their view of the human person. Fairbairn believed 
that the reality of external, not internal, 
relationships is the optimum for all persons. Aquinas 
believed that relationship with God, the first 
principle of reality, is the goal for all persons. 
More will be said of this in the following paragraphs. 
What is clear is that each man, employing his 
method as writer, philosopher, scientist, and 
practitioner, was breaking new ground which would 
serve as the foundation for later work on the human 
person as a theological and psychological being. In 
the following section, the author compares their 
studies of the person for the purpose of showing the 
compatibility and synergy of each in formulating an 
integrated secular/sacred concept of the person. 
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The Person as seen by Fairbairn and Aquinas 
Fairbairn's personality theory and Aquinas' 
anthropology each explain the person in a strikingly 
similar way. Central to each view is the primacy of 
the relational nature of human beings. This is 
strongly upheld by both theorists. For Fairbairn, 
this is the point which distinguished him from his 
predecessors. It is his hallmark. For Aquinas, what 
he held was not new on this issue, but the way he held 
and explained it was; that is, his non-Augustinian 
view of the unity of body and soul and his view of the 
compatibility of science and religion. 
Each man was committed to linking with the 
orthodox tradition of his field, Freud for Fairbairn 
and the church fathers and Scripture for Aquinas. Yet 
each drew from theorists whose works had not been 
applied in the way he applied them. Fairbairn 
utilized Klein's work and Aquinas leaned heavily on 
Aristotle. Each man also carried tradition and the 
theories of others to new heights with his own 
assumptions, data, and interpretations. 
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Implicit in their unique theoretical additions 
were each man's own secular and sacred resources. It 
is on the topic of the human person that these 
scientists focused their psychological and theological 
integrative powers. And taken together, their efforts 
are even more significant toward providing an 
integrative dialogue for understanding the person. In 
the following analysis, the author looks at the three 
questions defining this study of the person. The 
first two questions, the nature (what) and manner 
(how), are covered briefly, while the third question, 
the reason (why) is elaborated on more fully. 
Wbat is a Person--the Nature? 
Both theorists see the nature of a person as 
relationally based. Fairbairn says that relationship 
is the substance of human living and that "psychology 
may be said to resolve itself into a study of the 
relationships of the individual to his objects . . 
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 60). Aquinas says that "the 
ultimate explanation of our being lies in its being 
kindred with God" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 583). 
That relationship defines not only the normal 
behavior but also the very nature of the person is 
" 
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made even more clear in Fairbairn's statement that one 
cannot develop a self or selfhood without being in 
relation with others. Aquinas roots the nature of the 
person as being the very image of God, a God whose 
trinitarian nature is itself relational. 
How is a Person put together--the Manner? 
As Fairbairn's view of the relationship of the 
psyche and body disengaged him from Freudian hydraulic 
tradition, so Aquinas' concept of the relationship 
between soul and body distinguished him from the 
Augustinian Christian tradition. Each theorist, 
opposing his respective tradition, saw the 
psychological aspects (psyche or soul) and 
physiological aspects (body) working in harmony, 
unity. 
There are two extremes on either side of the 
argument for the unity of the psychological and 
physiological. Monism, held by materialists, reduces 
the psychological to the physiologi9al. This is the 
Freudian view against which Fairbairn fought. The 
other extreme is dualism, held by Platonists, which 
sees the "real" human as being only the soul, which 
inhabits the body, the body being the soul's 
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instrument, or prison. This is the Augustinian view 
against which Aquinas fought. 
Fairbairn affirms both aspects of the person 
operating in unity, stating that "the pristine 
personality of the child consists of a unitary dynamic 
ego" (Fairbairn, 1958, p. 375). 
In a word [biological] 'impulses' cannot be 
considered apart from the endopsychic structures 
[of the ego] which they energized and the object 
relationships which they enable these structures 
to establish . No 'impulses' can be regarded 
as existing in the absence of an ego structure, 
it will no longer be possible to preserve any 
psychological distinction between the id and the 
ego. (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 85, 88) 
Likewise, Aquinas holds to the co-working of 
psyche and soma. "Thus our body is both a 
physiological and a psychological object, is both 
organic and charged with human interests and values" 
(Gilby, 1955, p. 96). 
How does this impact the concept of the person as 
relational? Fairbairn makes it clear that the 
impulses which drive human interaction are not 
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impersonal but personal. Aquinas makes clear that a 
person can relate to God with his/her whole self, not 
being ashamed of the body as if it were evil as some 
ascetics would say. This gives dignity and worth to 
the human condition, psyche and soma, as unified in 
making contact, relationship with others, including 
God. 
WhY is there a Problem--the Reason? 
Fairbairn and Aquinas alike see the reason for 
the problem of a person as separation from real 
relationship and turning to less real ones. For 
Fairbairn, this translates into the infant's turning 
from relationship with real, external care givers to 
relationship with less real, internal object 
representations of these care givers, which the child 
creates through ego splitting, in an attempt to 
maintain a controlled relationship with them on 
her/his own terms. This separation from real, 
external relationship causes a split in the person's 
self, a fracturing of the self due to a less real, 
internal configuration of relational loyalties. 
Because the person is essentially in need of real, 
external relationship, this does not work, and the 
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person ends up manifesting maladaptive psychological 
symptoms. 
For Aquinas, it is the turning of the individual 
away from relationship with the real, external God, 
the one and only first principle of reality, to 
relationship with less real, idolatrous 
representations supplanting God in an attempt to 
continue a controlled relationship with Him on her/his 
own terms. This separation from the first principle 
of reality, upon which all reality is contingent, 
results in a fracturing of the person into unholy 
relational alliance with created things rather than 
the Creator of being. Because the person is 
essentially in need of relationship with the external, 
first principle of reality, God, this does not work 
and the person ends up manifesting maladaptive 
spiritual symptoms. 
Fairbairn sees the apogee of psychological health 
and functioning in the despair of the schizoid 
personality. This is the person who is almost 
completely given over to relationship with less real, 
internal objects instead of real, external objects. 
The epitome is the solitary person. However, there 
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are others with seemingly higher functioning who, 
despite their external, social facade, are actually 
operating intrapsychically at a schizoid level. 
Fairbairn says the schizoid position is a tragic 
situation and is a theme of much literature, 
especially tragedy and poetry. He alludes to the 
"Lucy" poems of Wordsworth as providing an example 
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 25). In one of these poems, 
entitled "Lucy Gray; or Solitude," a little girl, 
lovely to all appearances but actually quite lonely, 
is finally lost from her parents after a snow storm. 
The first two and the last two stanzas read as 
follows. 
Oft I had heard of Lucy Gray: 
And, when I crossed the wild, 
· I chanced to see at break of day 
The solitary child. 
No mate, no comrade Lucy knew; 
She dwelt on a wide moor, 
--The sweetest thing that ever grew 
Beside a human door! 
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[Lucy is then lost in the snow] 
--Yet some maintain that to this day 
She is a living child; 
That you may see sweet Lucy Gray 
Upon the lonesome wild. 
O'er rough and smooth she trips along, 
And never looks behind; 
And sings a solitary song 
That whistles in the wind. (Wordsworth, 1973, pp. 
135, 136) 
Fairbairn sees this as painting the picture of 
the tragic despair of a schizoid person, a person so 
caught up in her inner world that she ends up losing 
touch with her parents and her outer world, never 
growing emotionally beyond childhood, only, and for 
all time, singing a "solitary song that whistles in 
the wind." This is the height of psychological 
illness for Fairbairn, a kind of psychological death, 
complete separation from real relationship and being a 
prisoner of the internal, less real relationships of 
the split self. 
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Aquinas also sees separation from real 
relationship and commitment to less real, idolatrous 
relationships as the most tragic. For him, it is 
separation from the one and only first principle of 
reality, God, which is the most horrible consequence 
of sin. In ST, IIIa, 3, 1, ad 4, he states: 
Now it [sin] is hurtful to him [a person who has 
sinned] chiefly because it separates him from 
God; and in this respect the separation from God 
which is a punishment, should be more displeasing 
than the sin itself . . . Consequently, since 
this is the greatest hurt, inasmuch as it 
consists in privation of the greatest good, the 
greatest of all punishments will be separation 
from God. (Aquinas, 1981, p. 2568) 
Physical death is the soul being separated from the 
body but spiritual death is the soul being separated 
from God, who is the first principle of reality. For 
Fairbairn, the self being separated from relationships 
in reality, with real persons, is like a psychological 
death. 
Aquinas says, in ST, IIa, IIae, 94, 1-3, that 
idolatry is the most grievous sin, idolatry belonging 
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to superstition, which means "to exceed the due mode 
of divine worship, and this is done chiefly when 
divine worship is given to whom it should not be 
given" (Aquinas, 1981, p. 1589-1592) . For Aquinas 
this includes exchanging the truth of God for a lie, 
worshiping creatures instead of the Creator. Whether 
it be animal, man, demons, devil, or symbols like 
idols, it is all said to be idolatry (Aquinas, 1975a, 
pp. 140, 141). Yet, he is clear that creatures in 
themselves are not obstacles to one's communion with 
God. In I Sentences, I. iii, c., 3, 4, he says, "We 
make them so, by abusing them and by committing 
ourselves to them as if they were our ultimate goal" 
(Gilby, 1955, p. 130). Thus, idolatry is the exchange 
of worshiping the first principle of reality, which is 
God, for the lie which is worshiping of lesser 
realities as if they were the ultimate. 
Fairbairn speaks of the person as internalizing 
bad objects to control them yet therefore losing real 
relationship with external objects; making a pact with 
the devil as an ersatz father at the expense of true, 
external parental relationship; succumbing to 
"possession," as if by evil spirits, by internal bad 
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objects in place of external objects (Fairbairn, 
1952a, pp. 67, 70, 71). Fairbairn says that "sin" is 
always "regarded, according to the Hebraic conception, 
as seeking after strange gods, and according to the 
Christian conception, as yielding to the Devil . 
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 74). Here Fairbairn speaks in 
terms of idolatry, seeking after gods or the Devil 
instead of seeking after God. 
" 
This again emphasizes his idea of selling one's 
relationships in the external world in exchange for 
relationships with the gods, or Devil, of the internal 
world. Aquinas would say the person sells 
relationship with God for relationship with gods, 
idols, or the Devil, any created thing versus the 
Creator, any lesser reality than the first and only 
principle of reality, which is God. Fairbairn rarely 
employs as powerful an image to drive home his point 
as he does when he states, "for it may be said of all 
psychoneurotic and psychotic patients that, if a True 
Mass is being celebrated in the chancel, a Black Mass 
is being celebrated in the crypt" (Fairbairn, 1952a, 
p. 70). 
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Here one can clearly see the striking parallels 
in the thought of Aquinas and Fairbairn. Aquinas says 
that sin separates a person from God by turning the 
person from the first principle of reality to a lesser 
reality. Fairbairn says that turning from dealing 
with reality of external objects is the costly price 
paid for turning to internal objects, and that the 
person needs the psychotherapist to be a kind of 
priest for "'the forgiveness of sins'" (Fairbairn, 
1952a, p. 70). Aquinas says that idolatry, as a part 
of superstition, is the most grievous sin, giving 
devotion to whom or what it is not due. Fairbairn 
says the person's devotion to the idols of internal 
objects and the person's subsequent "possession" by 
them necessitates the psychotherapist being "the true 
successor to the exorcist . . . [concerned with] 'the 
casting out of devils'" (Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 70). 
Fairbairn's concept of psychopathology and 
Aquinas' concept of sin are seen here as quite related 
and complementary. Each believes that turning from 
real relationship and turning to less real 
relationship is against the nature of the person, 
separating the person from reality, splitting one in 
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one's devotion, and thus causing detrimental 
psychological, or spiritual, consequences. 
Implications and Suggestions for Further Research 
A major benefit of research on a topic as complex 
as developing an integrative dialogue is the potential 
created for making implications and proposing further 
research. The preceding section compared Fairbairn 
and Aquinas' view of the person using three questions 
as an outline, the nature (what) of a person, the 
manner (how) in which a person is made, and the reason 
(why) there is a problem. Based on the above 
comparison of Fairbairn and Aquinas' study of the 
person, the author here utilizes the same three 
questions to raise implications and suggest research 
possibilities. 
Wbat is a Person--the Nature? 
Fairbairn's view that one cannot develop a self 
or selfhood without being in relation with others 
raises the question of gender and gender identity 
formation. Is it necessary to have both same sex and 
opposite sex care givers in order to develop a sense 
of self? Does particular pathology result from the 
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lack of relationship with same sex or opposite sex 
care givers? Moberly would answer each in the 
affirmative. She says that, ideally, each child 
should have same sex and opposite sex attachment 
figures to relate to and that the absence of specific 
attachment figures may result in long-term damage to 
the child's capacity for attachment (Moberly, 1983, p. 
79). Her discussion of Bowlby's comment on the 
detachment from and "disidentification" with mother 
argues for the importance of the gender of care givers 
in the formation of gender identity (Moberly, 1983, 
pp. 10, 60) . 
Another aspect of the topic of identity is 
humankind's link with God. Aquinas roots the nature 
of the person as being the very image of God, a God 
whose trinitarian nature is itself relational. 
Further research outside the western tradition would 
be enlightening. Eastern Orthodox theology has much 
to say on the trinitarian nature of God and how the 
Christian reflects that relational nature. 
The Christian God is not just a unit but a union, 
not just unity but community. All, then, 
that is implied in our limited understanding of 
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the human person and of human love, this we 
affirm also of God the Trinity, while adding that 
in him these things mean infinitely more than we 
can ever imagine. . The final end of the 
spiritual Way [sic] is that we humans should also 
become part of this Trinitarian coherence or 
perichoresis [italics original], being wholly 
taken up into the circle of love that exists 
within God. So Christ prayed to his Father on 
the night before his Crucifixion: "May they all 
be one: as thou, Father, art in me, and I in 
thee, so may they also be one in us" (John 
17:21). (Ware, 1990, pp. 33, 35, 34) 
An interesting implication to the foregoing views 
of Fairbairn and Aquinas can now be presented. Since 
Fairbairn says that a person needs relationship with 
other human persons to form a self and Aquinas says 
that a person is by nature the image of a relational 
God and should relate to that God, can a person 
develop a self without being in relationship with God? 
The Western Orthodox theological answer to any 
question about the ability of a human person to exist 
or function without God is that people are finite and 
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thus contingent on the infinite God--a person cannot 
be or do anything without God. By virtue of one's 
very existence, a person has a relationship with God, 
acknowledged or not. A person's very nature is rooted 
in God ontologically. 
But the epistemological question remains. If a 
person chooses not to cultivate that relationship, 
chooses not to relate to or "get to know" God, can a 
self be attained? This author believes that the 
answer is yes and no, that the answer theologically is 
parallel to the development of the child 
psychologically. To have life at birth, the child 
need not know the full extent of the relationship with 
the mother. The child can relate to her as a part 
object and ascribe goodness or badness to her through 
undifferentiated splitting and projection. The mother 
must be good-enough regardless of the perspective of 
the child. But to have health past the early period, 
the child must develop enough to relate to the mother 
and others as whole objects and to separate and 
individuate from the mother and others in order to 
relate truly at a mature level. 
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Likewise, in one's relationship to God, to have 
life or existence at birth, the person need not know 
the full extent of the relationship with the God in 
whose nature one is created. A person can relate to 
God as a part object and ascribe goodness or badness 
to God through undifferentiated splitting and 
projection. God must be good-enough regardless of the 
perspective of the person. But to have health past 
the early period, the person must develop enough to 
relate to God and others as whole objects and to 
separate and individuate himself/herself from God and 
others in order to relate truly at a mature level. 
Therefore, the answer to the question of whether 
a person can fully develop a self without maturely 
relating to God is similar to the question of whether 
a person can fully develop a self without maturely 
relating to mother and others--it is a matter of 
degree, a matter of maturity. The more developed self 
is that of the person who is more maturely relating to 
others, including mother and God. And how one 
relates to mother impacts how one relates to God and 
vice versa--mature relating to God assumes mature 
relating to others, such as mother. This is seen in 
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the Christian Scripture and tradition that love of God 
must include love of human persons (Matthew 22: 37-40; 
1 John 2: 9, 10; 1 John 4: 19-21). Therefore, one 
cannot have a fully developed self if one is not 
relating maturely to real objects, whether these be 
mother and others (human persons) or God (divine 
persons) . 
That which constitutes mature relating to God is 
perhaps open to more subjectivity than a description 
of human relating. Yet the principle of relating well 
is constant whether it be with human or divine 
persons. The one who claims mature relationship with 
God is still subject to these principles. Further 
research here could focus on the exact nature of a 
mature relationship to each kind of object, divine and 
human, and how each impacts the other. 
How is a Person put together--the Manner? 
Against the reductionistic extremes of monism and 
dualism, Fairbairn and Aquinas affirm the working 
together of the psyche and soma. For Fairbairn, no 
biological impulses are regarded as existing in the 
absence of an ego structure. For Aquinas, the 
person's body is both organic and charged with human 
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interests and values. This gives dignity and worth to 
the human condition, psyche and soma, as unified in 
making contact and relating with others, including 
God. 
After all, Christ himself took on a human body, 
lived a sinless life, and developed a perfectly mature 
self. And the very purpose of his life and death was 
to make relationships better for all creation--between 
God and humans and between humans and humans as well 
as between humans and the rest of creation (John 3: 
16, 17; John 15; John 17). This was all accomplished 
when the Divine took on a human body. Certainly, 
mature relationships can be accomplished as a 
psyche/soma unity. 
This points to the question of just how biology 
and psychology work together in daily life to relate 
maturely to God. How does one relate to God without 
the extreme uses of the body found in hedonism or 
asceticism? Are there implications for how the two 
genders relate to God based on biology? What is the 
role of sexuality? If these ways of relating are 
"hard wired in," can they be changed? The answer to 
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these questions is beyond the scope of this paper but 
they would seem fruitful for further research. 
In some ways the answers to these may be likened 
to the mysteries described in physics, such as light 
being, at the same time and in the same way, both 
wave and particle. The analysis of the working 
together of psyche and soma may be like those 
processes which produce music, working together of 
left brain and right brain, linear and conceptual 
processing, words (psyche) and rhythm (body) . The 
mysteries of theology and psychology take their place 
alongside those of the "hard sciences." Each can and 
should be explored and yet each opens up the 
unexplored. Such is the state of human understanding 
on the interrelationship of the human psyche and soma. 
Wby is there a Problem--the Reason? 
Fairbairn and Aquinas alike see the reason for a 
person's problem as separation from real relationship 
and turning to less real ones. For Fairbairn, the 
self being separated from relationships in reality, 
with real persons, is like a psychological death. For 
Aquinas, it is separation from the one and only first 
principle of reality, God, which is the most horrible 
Psychoanalytic Object-Relations 
157 
consequence of sin. Physical death is the soul being 
separated from the body but spiritual death is the 
soul being separated from God, who is the first 
principle of reality. 
What is the connection between physical death and 
emotional (psychological) or spiritual (theological) 
death? There are indications that lonely people do 
not live as long as others. It is known that people 
die physically shortly after anniversaries or 
holidays. These would seem to indicate a connection 
between emotional death and physical death. In 
healthy individuals, physical separation should 
resolve into psychological separation. Chronic 
depression can sometimes be seen as unresolved grief, 
the unwillingness to let someone or something go. 
Physiologically, how does psychological death 
precipitate physical death? Can spiritual death cause 
psychological or physical death? What is the 
relationship between psychological and spiritual 
death? These questions warrant further research. 
Another point of comparison between the two 
theorists could be further explored. Fairbairn's 
concept of psychopathology and Aquinas' concept of sin 
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are seen as quite related and complementary. Each 
believes that turning from real relationship and 
turning to less real relationship is against the 
nature of the person, separating the person from 
reality, splitting oneself in one's devotion, and thus 
causing detrimental psychological, or spiritual, 
consequences. Aquinas says that sin separates a 
person from God by turning from the first principle of 
reality to a lesser reality. Fairbairn says that 
turning from dealing with reality of external objects 
is the costly price paid for turning to internal 
objects, and that the person needs the psychotherapist 
to be a kind of priest for "'the forgiveness of sins'" 
(Fairbairn, 1952a, p. 70). 
What is the source of the sin or pathology? It 
would seem that the "turning away" from the reality of 
real relationship is the root of the pathology or sin. 
The person, through one's own volition, is the source 
of the pathology or sin. Just what is the 
relationship between Fairbairn's concept of 
psychopathology and Aquinas' concept of sin? This 
author is saying that healthy relationship is the 
issue for both theorists and only the object of that 
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relationship is different. For Fairbairn, the object 
is other humans, particularly mother. For Aquinas, 
the object is God. 
In John 8:32, Christ said, "You shall know the 
truth, and the truth shall make you free" (The O.pen 
Bible, 1979, p. 1023). This would apply to freedom 
from internal objects as well as from idols and it 
comes when the truth, or reality, of real relationship 
is known. For Fairbairn, the liberating truth is 
knowing, or relating to, the person in the external 
world of reality. For Aquinas, the liberating truth 
is to know, or relate to, the God of reality, 
particularly Christ, who is truth personified. Christ 
said, in John 14:6, "I am the way, and the truth, and 
the life; no one comes to the Father but through Me 
(The Open Bible, 1979, p. 1031). 
It may be simplistic to say that relating to 
humans deals with the psychological while relating to 
God deals with the theological. This is because 
inherent in relating to God are healthy relationships 
with humans. Therefore, the theological subsumes the 
psychological as a category. This is not to suggest a 
rigid hierarchy of object relationships necessary to 
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the development of the self, that is, first mother, 
then father, then God, but rather a complex and subtle 
interplay. Perhaps human objects are necessary, but 
not sufficient, transitional objects to God. And 
perhaps relationship with God informs one's 
relationships with others, the explicit context of 
relating to God being the context of relating with 
others. It would be interesting research to see what 
is the normal pattern in human subjects for the 
development of this mutually informing, accommodation 
and assimilation, figure and ground interplay. 
Boston College professor John McDargh, S.J., 
states the case of this interplay well in his 
published Harvard doctoral dissertation. 
A colleague of mine challenged me with the 
question: "Are you trying to say that God is 
nothing but a cosmic teddy bear?" "No," I 
replied, "but I am arguing that we cannot 
understand fully what compels human beings to 
seek after that which they name 'God' until and 
unless we understand something about our 
relationship to our teddy bears." (McDargh, 1983, 
xiii) 
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Much has been made in this paper of the reason 
for there being a problem, the sin or pathology in a 
person. Further integrative dialogue could be done on 
Fairbairn and Aquinas' view of the solution to the 
problem, or what is curative, what restores health to 
the person. This would be a direct complement to this 
present paper. 
Integration of psychology and theology would be 
furthered still if the questions on the study of the 
person were posed to more representatives from 
psychology and theology. This would provide a broader 
comparison and application. Also, as seen in the poem 
quoted in this chapter, vistas in English literature 
are open for further research, for finding 
psychological and theological truth in literary works. 
There is much to be explored in the way of data and 
analysis in this continuing integrative dialogue. 
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Conclusion 
From the exposition in Chapters Two and Three, a 
common principle emerged from the writings of W. R. D. 
Fairbairn and Thomas Aquinas--the primacy of 
relationship. This principle served as a unifying 
theme for both domains, psychology and theology, and 
was the subject of this last chapter. 
In this chapter, the author noted Fairbairn's use 
of the sacred and Aquinas' use of the secular, 
compared the work of both theorists, and set forth 
implications and suggestions for further research. In 
this way, the material in the preceding chapters 
served as a foundation for this integrative dialogue. 
This dissertation asserted that the concept of 
relationship is the key to a psychoanalytic object-
relations theoretical and Thomistic theological 
understanding of the human personality. Second, it 
suggested that this concept of relationship may serve 
as an integration point between psychology and 
theology. 
It was seen that these theorist/practitioners 
share a common scientific and philosophical method 
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dedicated to the discovery of reality under God. Each 
believed that a person's nature is relationally based. 
Both believed that the person is a psyche and soma, a 
psychological and biological, unity. Each believed 
that turning from real relationship and turning to 
less real relationship is against the nature of the 
person, separating the person from reality, splitting 
one in one's devotion, and thus causing detrimental 
psychological, or spiritual, consequences. 
New York University theoretical psychologist Paul 
Vitz sets down a challenge for further work in the 
area of integration. "It may be a good time for 
Christianity quietly to work out an intellectual 
rapprochement between its own spiritual psychology and 
genuine psychoanalytic insights" (Vitz, 1977, p. 13). 
In part, this paper is a response to that challenge. 
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theology and psychoanalytic object-relations. 
Psychological Intern, Department of Psychology, Portland 
Adventist Medical Center, Portland, Oregon, full-time, 
August 1991 through July 1992. Unit rotations: locked 
adolescent, locked and unlocked adult, dual diagnosis, 
eating disorders, partial hospitalization. 
Master of Arts in Clinical Psychology, Highest Honors, 
George Fox College, Newberg, Oregon, August 1990. 
Doctorate in Pastoral Care, Southeastern Baptist 
Theological Seminary, Wake Forest, North Carolina, May 
1989. Dissertation on developing human resources 
through group intervention and spiritual direction. 
Clinical Pastoral Resident, Spartanburg Regional Medical 
Center, Spartanburg, South Carolina, full-time, June 
1986 to July 1987. Clinical specializations: AIDS 
patients, hospice unit, adult psychiatry. 
Master of Theology, Dallas Theological Seminary, Dallas, 
Texas, June 1986. Four year degree including cross-
cultural internship in El Salvador, C.A. 
Bachelor of Business Administration, Florida International 
University, Miami, Florida, May 1981. Major: Finance. 
EXPERIENCE 
Graduate Fellow, Individual Clinical Supervisor for 
students in M.A. in Counseling, Western Seminary, 
August 1990 through July 1991. 
Faculty, Administration, Psychology Student Liaison, George 
Fox College, August 1990 through August 1992. 
Counseling Therapist, Western Psychological & Counseling 
Services, P.C., Portland, Oregon, November 1989 to 
September 1991. 
Practicum Therapist, Tualatin Valley Community Mental 
Health, APA approved internship site, May 1990 to 
November 1990. 
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Pastor of Spiritual Development, Prestonwood Baptist 
Church, August 1987 to May 1989. Emotional and 
spiritual intervention with individuals, groups, and 
families in a 9,000 member not-for-profit corporation. 
Hospital Chaplain, Spartanburg Regional Medical Center, 
Spartanburg, South Carolina, June 1986 to June 1987. 
Awarded denominational endorsement as a clinical 
pastoral care provider. 
